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ARTICLE
DUE PROCCESS TOLLING OF THE POSTCONVICTION STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN
TENNESSEE AFTER WHITEHEAD V. STATE
By: Brennan T. Hughes*
On May 9, 2002, a man with a handgun slipped
inside the back door of B.B. King’s Restaurant and Blues
Club in Memphis, Tennessee. He headed toward the
basement office where the restaurant kept its safe. At the
same time, a chef named Mr. Arnold was in the basement
of B.B. King’s. Mr. Arnold noticed a man carrying a
shipping box. When Mr. Arnold asked the man what he
was doing in the basement, the man pulled out a gun. Mr.
Arnold fought back. The gunman shot him in the head. It
was not fatal.
Shortly thereafter, a purchasing agent walked into
the basement office of the restaurant. To her surprise, on
the office floor she saw a man, Mr. Arnold, bleeding, with
his hands and feet hog-tied behind his back. The next thing
the woman saw was a gun pointed at her face. The gunman
forced her to the floor and hog-tied her, too. In doing so,
the gunman kneed her in the back, cracking one of her
vertebrae. Later, a produce delivery driver and another
purchasing agent came downstairs. They also were
* Brennan T. Hughes, B.A., M.A. (Freed-Hardeman University),
M.Div. (Lipscomb University Hazelip School of Theology), J.D.
(Vanderbilt University Law School), is a judicial clerk for the United
States Court of Appeals. The author dedicates this paper to Dr. Tom
and Faye Hughes for their unflagging support of his various careers and
other endeavors.
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captured. The gunman ordered each victim to open the safe.
None of them could, and soon, there were four people lying
hog-tied on the office floor.
A fifth person, Ms. Miller, stumbled upon the scene.
When she entered the office, she screamed and
immediately fled down the hallway. The gunman chased
and caught her. But while the gunman was outside the
room, Mr. Arnold, bleeding from the gunshot wound to his
head, struggled free from his bonds and armed himself with
a broom. Wielding this wooden weapon, Mr. Arnold waited
behind the door as the gunman dragged the petrified Ms.
Miller back into the office. Mr. Arnold lunged at his
assailant and swung his broom, but to no avail. The
gunman shot him again, this time in the hip. Again, Mr.
Arnold found himself hog-tied on the floor. Frustrated that
no one knew the combination to the safe, the gunman
removed his victims’ money and jewelry. The gunman
knew he had to find the general manager to open the safe,
so he went upstairs.
Bleeding from the head and hip, Mr. Arnold again
struggled up from the floor and telephoned the police. He
was still on the phone when someone knocked on the office
door. It was the general manager. The gunman found the
manager, but the manager had distracted the gunman and
escaped. With the police on the way and his victims free,
the robbery was over. The gunman, later identified by
witnesses as Artis Whitehead, fled the scene.
Although Mr. Whitehead’s robbery attempt was a
dismal failure, the State’s prosecution against him was a
smashing success. A Memphis jury convicted Mr.
Whitehead of five counts of especially aggravated
kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of
aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated
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robbery, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery.
Mr. Whitehead received a 249-year sentence.1
Mr. Whitehead lost his direct appeal, and the state
and federal supreme courts declined to accept his case. At
this point, Mr. Whitehead’s story makes an impact on
Tennessee law. Mr. Whitehead filed a petition seeking a
new trial under Tennessee’s Post-Conviction Procedure
Act.2 Unfortunately for him, Mr. Whitehead failed to
submit his petition within the one-year statute of
limitations. Mr. Whitehead argued, however, that his
petition ought not be dismissed as untimely on the ground
of due process.3
Like the crime itself, Mr. Whitehead’s postconviction process was a series of unfortunate events. Mr.
Whitehead had hired an attorney to handle his direct
appeal. When the direct appeal was concluded by virtue of
the federal Supreme Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari,
appellate counsel sent Mr. Whitehead what was essentially
a good-bye letter informing him that his appeal was
concluded and that he had one year to file for postconviction relief. But there were two problems. First,
appellate counsel’s letter gave Mr. Whitehead the wrong
deadline date because the attorney had mistakenly
calculated his statute of limitations period from the federal
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari rather than the state
supreme court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Appellate
Procedure 11 application to appeal. Second, although the
letter asked Mr. Whitehead where he would like his records
sent and although Mr. Whitehead responded twice,
appellate counsel did not send Mr. Whitehead his trial
records until after the actual statute of limitations had
1

These facts were gleaned from State v. Whitehead, No. W200403058-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 1273749, at *1-4 (Tenn. Crim. App.
May 10, 2006), appeal denied (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2006).
2
TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 40-30-101 to -122 (2012 & Supp. 2013).
3
See Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615, 618-21 (Tenn. 2013).

10

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 11
expired. As soon as he received the record, Mr. Whitehead
quickly composed a relatively lengthy and detailed postconviction petition, but by then it was too late.4
The post-conviction court and the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals decided that theses circumstances did
not authorize them to toll the post-conviction statute of
limitations on due process grounds.5 The Tennessee
Supreme Court accepted the case and used the opportunity
to adopt a new rule for evaluating whether due process
warrants tolling the one-year post-conviction deadline.
In its opinion, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reviewed the grounds for which it had tolled the statute of
limitations in the past. As of 2013, the court had designated
three categories of circumstances that called for due
process tolling: later-arising claims, mental incompetence,
and serious attorney misconduct.6 Mr. Whitehead said his
case was an attorney misconduct case. Nonetheless, in a
previous case the court held that only egregious intentional
misconduct, not mere attorney negligence, could trigger
due process tolling.7 The court determined in Whitehead
that the distinction between attorney negligence and
attorney misconduct was too nebulous to be helpful.8 The
court also decided to discard its previous “ad hoc”
approach to due process tolling.9 Instead, the court decided
to follow the federal courts and many state jurisdictions and
adopt the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Holland
v. Florida as a one-size-fits-all framework for analyzing
post-conviction due process tolling claims.10 Under the
4

See id.
See id. at 620; Whitehead v. State, No. W2010-00784-CCA-R3-PC,
2011 WL 3912856, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2011).
6
Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 623-24.
7
See id. at 624-25; Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 358 (Tenn. 2011);
Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 468 n.7 (Tenn. 2001).
8
Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 630-31.
9
Id. at 631.
10
Id.
5
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Holland test, a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of a
statute of limitations if the petitioner (1) “has been pursuing
his or her rights diligently, and (2) . . . some extraordinary
circumstance stood in [the petitioner’s] way and prevented
timely filing.”11
The problem that gives rise to this article is that, in
its post-Whitehead decisions, the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals has not consistently applied the
Whitehead-Holland test. Instead of recognizing that the
Tennessee Supreme Court intended the Whitehead-Holland
test to replace its prior ad hoc framework, several panels of
the Court of Criminal Appeals have understood the test to
apply only in attorney misconduct cases like Mr.
Whitehead’s. Under this view, the three pre-Whitehead
categories of circumstances that warrant due process tolling
remain in force, but the Whitehead-Holland test comes into
play only when the third category is at issue. This article
will trace the development of this misunderstanding and
attempt to correct it.
Part I will summarize the case law leading up to
Whitehead v. State and engage in a more fine-grained
reading of the analytical section of the Tennessee Supreme
Court’s 2013 Whitehead opinion. Part II will survey the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ use of the
Whitehead opinion between the publication of Whitehead
and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s January 2014 opinion,
Bush v. State. Part III will examine Bush v. State, in which
the Tennessee Supreme Court applied the WhiteheadHolland test in a case that did not concern attorney error.
One particular sentence in Bush appears to have been
written to gently correct the intermediate appellate court’s
misunderstanding of the scope of Whitehead. Part IV will
survey the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ use of the
Whitehead opinion since the publication of Bush in January
11

Id. (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).
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2014, which shows that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s
attempt in Bush to clarify Whitehead largely went
unnoticed. Part V makes concluding recommendations.
I. Due Process Tolling Takes Shape: From Burford to
Whitehead
It is appropriate at this juncture to say a few words
about the Post-Conviction Procedure Act and due process.
Tennessee’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act, which was
significantly amended in 1995, allows prisoners who did
not appeal their convictions, or whose state appeals are
exhausted, to challenge their conviction or sentence on the
basis of the conviction or sentence being “void or voidable
because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the
Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United
States.”12 The majority of post-conviction petitions allege
ineffective assistance of counsel.
As courts are sometimes quick to point out, the
United States Constitution does not require states to
provide prisoners with post-conviction relief.13 But
Tennessee has provided post-conviction relief since the
passage of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act in 1967.14
The 1986 Amendment to the Act gave prisoners three years
after their sentences became final to file a petition for postconviction relief.15 This statute of limitations is what gave
rise to the doctrine of due process tolling in Tennessee.
The concept of due process, as enshrined in the state
and federal constitutions,16 embodies the concepts of
12

TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-103 (2012).
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987).
14
Act of May 25, 1967, ch. 310, 1967 Tenn. Pub. Acts 801.
15
See Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Tenn. 1992) (citing 1986
Tenn. Pub. Acts 348).
16
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .”); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall .
13
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fundamental fairness and the community’s sense of
decency and fair play.17 As a leading Tennessee case
explains, there is no precise definition of due process
because what is fundamentally fair depends on the facts of
the individual situation.18 The contours of due process are
therefore flexible and can be ascertained, the Tennessee
Supreme Court has held, by weighing three factors: “(1) the
[nature of the] private interest at stake; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of [that] interest through the
procedures used and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, (3) the
government’s interest, including the nature of the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”19 The question thus becomes: under this balancing
of interests, when does the Post-Conviction Procedure
Act’s statute of limitations become fundamentally unfair
such that applying the statute would offend the citizenry’s
notions of fair play and decency?
A. Placing Limitations on the Statute of Limitations
The seminal Tennessee due process tolling case is
Burford v. State.20 The post-conviction petitioner in
. . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. . . .”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“[N]o man shall be taken or
imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life,
liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the
land.”).
17
See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272,
277 (Tenn. 2000).
18
Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 277.
19
Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Phillips v.
State Bd. of Regents, 863 S.W.2d 45, 50 (Tenn. 1993)).
20
Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 204.
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Burford claimed he had been “caught in a procedural
trap.”21 The petitioner, a repeat offender, had been given an
enhanced sentence. After the three-year post-conviction
deadline for the enhanced sentence expired, the trial court
ruled that his predicate convictions were invalid, and
vacated them.22 However, the expiration of the statute of
limitations barred Mr. Burford from petitioning to have his
subsequent enhanced sentence reduced. Mr. Burford argued
to the Tennessee Supreme Court that the statute of
limitations was unconstitutional on its face. While the high
court rejected this argument, it held that denying Mr.
Burford relief on the basis of these “later arising grounds”
would violate due process.
The court explained that on one hand the State had a
legitimate interest in enacting procedural rules in the postconviction context to prevent stale or fraudulent claims and
to curtail the costs associated with repeated groundless
claims.23 On the other hand, the court held that before the
State can terminate a claim for failure to comply with
procedural rules, such as a statute of limitations, due
process requires that the claimant be given a “reasonable
opportunity” to have the issue heard and determined.24 The
court found the Act’s deadline to be unreasonable under
these circumstances, and remanded the case for an
evidentiary hearing.25 Burford therefore established that
certain types of “later-arising grounds” claims may warrant
tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations.26
Three years after Burford, the Tennessee General
Assembly significantly amended the Post-Conviction
21

Id. at 208.
Id. at 210.
23
Id. at 207.
24
Id. at 208.
25
Id. at 205.
26
See Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1995) (applying Burford
and declining to toll the statute of limitations).
22
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Procedure Act.27 Two changes are significant to this
discussion. First, the legislature shortened the statute of
limitations from three years to one year.28 The legislature
doubled down on this statute of limitations in 1996 when it
added the following proviso to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30102(a):
The statute of limitations
shall not be tolled for any
reason, including any tolling
or saving provision otherwise
available at law or equity.
Time is of the essence of the
right to file a petition for
post-conviction relief or
motion to reopen established
by this chapter, and the oneyear limitations period is an
element of the right to file the
action and is a condition
upon its exercise. Except as
specifically
provided
in
subsections (b) and (c), the
right to file a petition for
post-conviction relief or a
motion to reopen under this
chapter shall be extinguished
upon the expiration of the
limitations period.29

27

Post-Conviction Procedure Act of April 26, 1995, ch. 207, 1995
Tenn. Pub. Acts 305.
28
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(a).
29
Post-Conviction Procedure Act of Apr. 25, 1996, ch. 995, 1996 Tenn.
Pub. Acts 753.
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This was a clear message from the General Assembly to the
courts that the statute of limitations was meant to have
teeth.
Second, the legislature codified a list of three
exceptional circumstances that would permit a petitioner to
bypass the statute of limitations or to amend a previouslyfiled petition.30 The first statutory exception is implicated
when an appellate court recognizes a new constitutional
right for which retroactive application is required. That
ruling triggers a new one-year statute of limitations.31 The
second exception occurs when the petitioner obtains “new
scientific evidence establishing that the petitioner is
actually innocent of the offense or offenses for which the
petitioner was convicted.”32 The third exception codifies
the Burford scenario: when a sentence enhancement is
based on a prior conviction that is later held invalid, this
holding resets the statute of limitations.33
These three new statutory exceptions, however, did
not take the Tennessee Supreme Court out of the due
process tolling business. The court recognized a second due
process-based exception to the post-conviction statute of
limitations in 2000 in Seals v. State.34 The court in Seals
essentially established that when a prisoner is mentally
incompetent to file for post-conviction relief, the statute of

30

See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(b) (exceptions to the statute of
limitations); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-117 (grounds for amending
a previously-filed petition). The circumstances described in these two
statutes are identical.
31
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(b)(1).
32
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(b)(2). The Tennessee Supreme
Court interpreted this provision in Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594
(Tenn. 2012).
33
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-102(b)(3).
34
Seals, 23 S.W.3d, at 272.
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limitations is tolled during the period of the prisoner’s
incompetency.35
The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized a third
due process tolling exception in 2001 in Williams v. State,36
the case that set the stage for Whitehead. Mr. Williams
claimed his untimely post-conviction petition had been
unfairly dismissed. Mr. Williams said his appointed
appellate counsel withdrew from representation without
informing him, and in fact misled Mr. Williams into
believing he was appealing the case to the Tennessee
Supreme Court. While Mr. Williams waited to learn the
outcome of this appeal, he alleged that the deadlines for
appealing to the supreme court and for petitioning for postconviction relief both passed.37
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that if Mr.
Williams “was, in fact, misled to believe that counsel was
continuing the appeals process,” this would require tolling
the statute of limitations.38 The court later explained this
decision: “[l]ike the ‛procedural trap’ in Burford v. State
and the petitioner’s mental incompetence in Seals v. State,
‛an attorney’s misrepresentation, either attributable to
deception or other misconduct, would also be beyond a
defendant’s control.’”39 The court emphasized that mere
attorney negligence would not meet this threshold.40 The
supreme court remanded Mr. Williams’s case for an

35

Id. at 279. When a prisoner is mentally incompetent, Tennessee
common law permits a “next friend” to file a post-conviction petition
on the prisoner’s behalf. See Reid ex rel. Martiniano v. State, 396
S.W.3d 478, 484 & n.1 (Tenn. 2013).
36
Williams, supra note 7, at 464.
37
Id. at 470-71.
38
Id. at 471.
39
Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 624 (quoting Williams, 44 S.W.3d at
469).
40
Williams, 44 S.W.3d at 468 n.7.
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evidentiary hearing, and the post-conviction court found
that due process tolling was not actually warranted.41
Justice Drowota, joined by Justice Holder, dissented
in Williams and averred that the conduct of Mr. Williams’s
attorney was “textbook negligence,” and that there was no
meaningful distinction between attorney negligence and
attorney misconduct.42 Instead, the dissenting Justices
would have effectuated the Tennessee General Assembly’s
“clearly expressed legislative intent” that the statute of
limitations be strictly construed, and would have denied
relief.43
The Tennessee Supreme Court elaborated on its
Williams decision in Smith v. State44 in 2011. Regarding the
rule of Williams, the court noted:
In every case in which
we have held the statute of
limitations is tolled, the
pervasive theme is that
circumstances beyond a
petitioner’s control prevented
the petitioner from filing a
petition for post-conviction
relief within the statute of
limitations. In Williams, 44
S.W.3d at 468, we held that
misrepresentation concerning
the status of the direct appeal
could constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. Short
41

Id. at 624 & n.9; Williams v. State, No. E2004-01267-CCA-R3-PC,
2005 WL 2148626, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2005), appeal
denied (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005).
42
Williams, 44 S.W.3d at 476-77 (Drowota, J., dissenting).
43
Id. at 474, 476 (Drowota, J., dissenting).
44
Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322 (Tenn. 2011).
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of active misrepresentation,
however, we have never held
that trial or appellate
counsel’s inadvertent or
negligent failure to inform his
or her client of the right to
file a post-conviction petition
constitutes
ineffective
assistance of counsel.45
Thus, after the Williams and Smith decisions, it appeared
that due process tolling was warranted only when a
prisoner suffered from active misrepresentation – not mere
negligence – of his or her attorney. Essentially, petitioners
who did not qualify for one of the three statutory
exceptions could obtain due process tolling only if they
could fit their claim into one of three common law
pigeonholes: (1) later-arising claims under Burford; (2)
mental incompetence under Seals; and (3) active attorney
misrepresentation under Williams and Smith. The Court’s
2013 decision in Whitehead v. State changed this calculus.
B. Whitehead v. State: The Tennessee Supreme
Court Shifts Gears
The distinction between attorney negligence and
willful attorney misconduct that the Tennessee Supreme
Court struggled to maintain in Williams and Smith fell apart
once the court accepted Artis Whitehead’s post-conviction
appeal. Here was a clear case of attorney negligence which
nevertheless left Mr. Whitehead “trapped.” Despite his best
efforts, he was unable to obtain his trial records. Further,
despite his attempt to file a timely petition, he was
sabotaged by the fact his appellate attorney gave him the
45

Id. at 358 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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wrong deadline date in her farewell letter. While the court
signaled that neither problem would have warranted tolling
on its own, the “sockdolager” – or knockout blow – that
warranted tolling was the effect of the combination of
attorney errors.46 These facts did not fit the willful
misconduct framework of Williams and Smith because the
attorney testified that she had no idea why she
miscalculated Mr. Whitehead’s deadline, and no evidence
suggested the failure to return Mr. Whitehead’s files was
anything more than an inter-office organizational
management mishap.47 Faced with these facts, the court not
only decided that the negligence/misconduct distinction had
to go, but also went further.
The court began its analysis by recounting in detail
its prior decisions concerning due process tolling.48 The
court began this historical survey by stating, “To date, this
Court has identified three circumstances in which due
process requires tolling the post-conviction statute of
limitations.”49 The court then described the three grounds:
later-arising claims, mental incompetence, and attorney
misconduct.50
In the next section of the opinion, the court looked
to “cases from other jurisdictions that have considered a
prisoner’s similar claims under the analogous doctrine of
‛equitable tolling.’”51 The court deemed these foreign cases
instructive because “Tennessee’s doctrine of due process
tolling in the context of petitions for post-conviction relief
is essentially the same as the doctrine of equitable tolling
recognized in the federal courts and the courts of other
46

Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 632.
Id. at 619; see also Whitehead v. State, No. W2010-00784-CCA-R3PC, 2011 WL 3912856 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2011).
48
Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 623-25.
49
Id. at 623.
50
Id. at 623-25.
51
Id. at 626. The Court’s discussion of cases from other jurisdictions is
found at 626-30.
47
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states.”52 By recognizing this equivalence, the court was
charting new territory.
To demonstrate this equivalence between
Tennessee’s post-conviction due process tolling and the
doctrine of equitable tolling recognized by other states
(particularly by federal habeas courts), the court
emphasized the parallels between a key line in Smith v.
State and the wording of the federal Holland test. Both
doctrines, the court said, are triggered when “circumstances
beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing
his or her petition on time.”53 In fact, the court said there
was no “substantive difference” between the application of
the two doctrines.54
The court then performed an in-depth examination
of the 2010 United States Supreme Court case of Holland
v. Florida (which “solidified” the federal doctrine) and the
2012 case of Maples v. Thomas,55 in which the Supreme
Court adopted much of the reasoning of Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion in Holland.56 Finding Holland and
Maples “persuasive,” the Tennessee Supreme Court
concluded that when it comes to attorney misconduct, the
proper focus is not on the attorney’s mental state, but upon
“whether the result of that negligent, reckless, or
intentional attorney misbehavior amounted to an
extraordinary circumstance beyond the petitioner’s control
that thwarted timely filing.”57 Under principles of agency
law, when such extraordinary circumstances occur, the
attorney’s errors cannot be fairly attributed to the client.58

52

Id. at 626.
Id. (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010); Smith, 357
S.W.3d at 358).
54
Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 627.
55
Maples, v. Thomas,132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
56
Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 627-30.
57
Id. at 631.
58
Id. at 629-30.
53
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Then comes the passage upon which this article
must focus. In announcing its key holding, the court states:
Rather than perpetuate an
artificial
and
unhelpful
distinction between attorney
negligence and attorney
misrepresentation,
we
conclude that the better
course is to adopt the rule of
Holland and Maples for
determining
when
due
process necessitates tolling
the
Post-Conviction
Procedure Act’s one-year
statute of limitations. While
the elements of the Holland
rule have been present in this
state’s due process tolling
jurisprudence for some time,
our courts have tended to
focus on whether particular
cases fit one of the three ad
hoc due process exceptions
we have identified in the past,
i.e., later-arising claims,
petitioner
mental
incompetence, and attorney
misrepresentation
significantly more egregious
than negligence.
Henceforth, when a
post-conviction
petitioner
argues that due process
requires tolling the Post-
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Conviction Procedure Act’s
statute of limitations based on
the conduct of his or her
lawyer, the two-prong inquiry
of Holland and Maples
should guide the analysis. A
petitioner is entitled to due
process tolling upon a
showing (1) that he or she has
been pursuing his or her
rights diligently, and (2) that
some
extraordinary
circumstance stood in his
or her way and prevented
timely filing.59
The court explained here that the three categories of
exceptions the court “identified in the past” were developed
“ad hoc,” and therefore lacked a clear unifying principle.
Going forward (“Henceforth”), the court intends to replace
this “ad hoc” approach with a single framework – the same
one used by the federal courts and most other states, the
Holland test.
The court is not necessarily sweeping away the
three historical grounds for due process tolling. A person
can reasonably infer from Whitehead that later-arising
claims and petitioner mental incompetence will still toll the
statute, even if these situations may not necessarily involve
a petitioner who “has been pursuing his or her rights
diligently.”60 The Whitehead opinion effectively abrogates
the third category – attorney misconduct – and adopts a
one-size-fits-all tool for assessing any claims in which a
prisoner’s attempted compliance with the statute of
limitations is thwarted by external circumstances. For
59
60

Id at 631.
Id.
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example, the behavior of prison officials may give rise to a
Whitehead-Holland claim.
The problem is that the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals did not fully grasp the sweeping nature
of the court’s adoption of the Holland test. The Tennessee
Supreme Court attempted to correct this misapprehension
in Bush v. State, but this attempt at correcting the Court of
Criminal Appeals went essentially unnoticed and unheeded.
II. The Whitehead-Holland Test in the Court of Criminal
Appeals: From Whitehead to Bush
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals issued
seven opinions between Whitehead v. State61 on March 21,
2013, and Bush v. State62 on January 28, 2014, that are
relevant to our discussion – four from the Middle Section
of the Court of Criminal Appeals63 and three from the
Western Section.64 Each of these cases was assigned on
briefs.
The first two opinions – Morgan v. State and
Lackey v. State – were released on the same day by the
same three-judge panel of the Middle Division. Both
opinions appear to interpret Whitehead in a manner that
61

Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 618.
Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1 (2014).
63
Alderson v. State, No. M2012-01154-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL
6237027 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 3, 2013); Perry v. State, No. M201300986-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 5775814 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24,
2013), appeal denied (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2014); Lackey v. State, No.
M2012-01482-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 5232345 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Sept. 17, 2013), appeal denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2014); Morgan v. State,
No. M2012-02329-CCA-R3-CO, 2013 WL 5232459 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Sept. 17, 2013).
64
Brown v. State, No. W2012-02584-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 6405736
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2013); Nelson v. State, No. W2012-02234CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 6001955 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2013);
Thomas v. State, No. W2012-00999-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 6001938
(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2013), appeal denied (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2014).
62
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perpetuates the three pre-Whitehead categories as the
framework that governs due process tolling. The key
language in both opinions is verbatim: “In the recent case
of Artis Whitehead v. State of Tennessee, our supreme court
discussed the matter of due process in a post-conviction
context. The court identified three circumstances in which
due process requires tolling the post-conviction statute of
limitations.”65 The appellate court then listed the three
historical circumstances. Nowhere in these two opinions
does the appellate court reference the Holland test.
As suggested in part I.B, the section of Whitehead
that the Court of Criminal Appeals referenced was a section
containing an historical survey of due process tolling in
Tennessee. The Whitehead opinion went on to describe
these three categories as exceptions that the court had
“identified in the past” in an “ad hoc” manner.66 Instead,
“[h]enceforth,” the court said, the Holland test should apply
in due process tolling cases, especially since the Holland
test was in substance identical to Tennessee’s guiding
principle that due process tolling depended on the presence
of circumstances “beyond a petitioner’s control.”67 The
failure of the Court of Criminal Appeals to mention this
shift in its first two post-Whitehead opinions set an
unfortunate precedent.
The next case, Perry v. State, came a month later
from a different panel of the Middle Section. Mr. Perry
sought tolling on the basis that he believed his attorney had
appealed his case to the Tennessee Supreme Court, when in

65

Lackey, 2013 WL 5232345, at *5; Morgan, 2013 WL 5232459, at *3.
In Lackey, the petitioner alleged he had been mentally incompetent. In
Morgan, the petitioner alleged that his post-conviction attorney’s
failures should have tolled the statute of limitations.
66
Whitehead, supra note 3 at 631.
67
Id. at 625 (quoting Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 358 (Tenn.
2011)).
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fact the attorney had not.68 In addressing Whitehead, the
appellate court stated:
Recently, the Tennessee
Supreme Court clarified its
earlier holdings with regard
to due process tolling based
on the conduct of a
petitioner’s attorney, ruling in
Whitehead that ‘[a] petitioner
is entitled to due process
tolling upon a showing (1)
that he or she has been
pursuing his or her rights
diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance
stood in his or her way and
prevented timely filing.’69
This characterization of Whitehead is essentially correct.
The Perry court also found no need to discuss the three preWhitehead categories of due process tolling situations.
The next opinion, Thomas v. State,70 is the first
post-Whitehead tolling opinion from the Western Section.
The court in Thomas stated the significance of Whitehead
even more precisely than the court in Perry: “In the recent
case of Whitehead v. State, our supreme court adopted a
new standard for determining if due process required
tolling of the statute of limitations in post-conviction
cases.”71 The opinion then quotes two paragraphs from

68

Perry, 2013 WL 5775814, at *2.
Id. (quoting Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 631).
70
Thomas, 2013 WL 6001938, at *2 (applying the Holland test and
finding no ground for relief).
71
Id.
69
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Whitehead, beginning at the crucial “[h]enceforth.”72 When
it comes to applying Whitehead, the Western Section
started off on the right foot.
The next case, Nelson v. State,73 came four days
later from another Western Section panel. The Nelson
opinion also handled Whitehead correctly, surmising that
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Whitehead “clarified the
proper analysis” for attorney misconduct tolling cases.74
The court analyzed Whitehead rather thoroughly and found
no basis for tolling the statute for Mr. Nelson.
The sixth case is Alderson v. State,75 which was
released by the Middle Section in December 2013. Rather
than claiming attorney misconduct, the petitioner in
Alderson alleged that misinformation given by prison
officials prevented her from filing on time.76 Although the
Alderson court appeared poised to apply the WhiteheadHolland test, it noted that the post-conviction court had
discredited the petitioner’s testimony that she had been
misled by a prison guard concerning whether she could file
for post-conviction relief.77 Because the post-conviction
court found no misinformation was given, the Court of
Criminal Appeals found that Ms. Alderson’s claim did not
merit relief.78
The seventh opinion that emerged between
Whitehead and Bush was written by the same judge who
authored the first two. This opinion, Brown v. State,79
exacerbated the misinterpretation of Whitehead that was
72

Id.
Nelson, 2013 WL 6001955.
74
Id. at *4.
75
Alderson, 2013 WL 6237027.
76
Id. at *1.
77
Id. at *5.
78
Id. at *6.
79
Brown v. State, No. No. W2012-02584-CCA-MR3-PC, 2013 WL
6405736, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 5, 2013), appeal denied (Tenn.
May 14, 2014).
73
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latent in Morgan and Lackey. It may have prompted the
Tennessee Supreme Court to make a clarification in Bush.
The tolling issue in Brown was not premised on
alleged attorney error. Instead, Mr. Brown stated that he
was unable to complete his petition on time because the
correctional facility where he was housed was on
“administrative lockdown” for a few days about one week
before his petition was due.80 Would the Court of Criminal
Appeals apply the Whitehead-Holland test even though
Brown was not an attorney misconduct case? The answer at
that time was no.
The Brown court’s treatment of Whitehead began
well enough. “Our supreme court recently noted,” the court
said, that “our courts have tended to focus on one of the
three ad hoc due process exceptions we have identified in
the past.”81 The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the
supreme court in Whitehead “adopted a two-prong analysis
from [Holland and Maples].”82 However, the Brown court
then decided to read Whitehead narrowly:
The way the Whitehead
opinion is written, the twoprong inquiry is literally
limited to situations of
attorney
conduct.
(‘Henceforth, when a postconviction petitioner argues
that due process requires
tolling the Post-Conviction
Procedure Act’s statute of
limitations based on the
conduct of his or her
lawyer, the two prong
80

Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *2 (quoting Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 631).
82
Id.
81
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inquiry of Holland and
Maples should guide the
analysis.’ Whitehead, 402
S.W.3d at 631 (emphasis
added)).83
Although the Brown court made a plausible reading
of Whitehead, the court’s decision to focus on the phrase
“based on the conduct of his or her lawyer” narrowed the
impact of Whitehead in a way that is at odds with other
language in the Whitehead opinion.84 In Whitehead, the
Tennessee Supreme Court intended to adopt the same onesize-fits-all equitable tolling test that most jurisdictions
were already using. A holistic reading of Whitehead does
not generate the conclusion that the Whitehead court
intended the Holland test apply solely in attorney
misconduct cases. The supreme court acted quickly to
repudiate this narrow interpretation.
III. Bush v. State: All You Need is Whitehead
The Brown opinion was released on December 5,
2013.85 On January 28, 2014, the Tennessee Supreme Court
announced Bush v. State.86 Mr. Bush pled guilty to
attempted rape but was not informed that his guilty plea
would result in a sentence of lifetime community
supervision. Mr. Bush was eventually released and was
surprised to learn of this additional indeterminate
sentence.87 The Tennessee Supreme Court held that failure
to inform a defendant that his or her plea subjects him or

83

Id.
See id.
85
Brown, No. 2013 WL 6405736.
86
Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 1.
87
Id. at 6.
84
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her to lifetime community supervision violates due
process.88
The main issue in Bush was whether the petitioner
could rely on the statutory exception to the post-conviction
statute of limitations that concerned the retroactive
application of new constitutional rulings.89 The court
determined that its 2010 ruling in Ward v. State90 did not
qualify for retroactive application under the Teague v.
Lane91 test that the Tennessee General Assembly had
imported into the Post-Conviction Procedure Act in 1995.92
The court then considered whether Mr. Bush might
nevertheless be eligible for due process tolling, and applied
the Whitehead-Holland test for the first time since the
Whitehead opinion.93
The court summarized its prior holding in
Whitehead (pay particular attention to the final sentence):
We
recently
clarified
Tennessee’s due process
tolling standard in Whitehead
v. State. We held that a postconviction
petitioner
is
entitled to due process tolling
of the one-year statute of
limitations upon a showing
(1) that he or she has been
pursuing his or her rights
diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance
88

See Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010).
Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 5.
90
Ward, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010).
91
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
92
Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 5-6 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30102(b)(1), (2012)).
93
Id. at 21-23.
89
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stood in his or her way and
prevented
timely
filing.
Whitehead v. State, 402
S.W.3d at 631 (citing
Holland v. Florida, [560 U.S.
631, 648-49 (2010)]). This
rule applies to all due process
tolling claims, not just those
that concern alleged attorney
misconduct.94
Several observations are noteworthy at this juncture.
First, the court in Bush applied the Whitehead-Holland test
in a case where the ground for tolling had nothing
whatsoever to do with attorney negligence or misconduct.
Simply put, Mr. Bush’s case did not fit into any of the three
pre-Whitehead ad hoc due process tolling categories. This
approach repudiates the reasoning of the Court of Criminal
Appeals in Brown v. State that the Whitehead-Holland test
applies only to tolling claims based on attorney
misconduct.95
Second, the supreme court made the repudiation of
Brown explicit, stating that the Whitehead-Holland test
“applies to all due process tolling claims, not just those that
concern alleged attorney misconduct.”96 Although the
supreme court in Bush did not cite Brown (or Morgan or
Lackey), the supreme court likely reasoned that this
sentence, embedded in a tolling case that was not based on
attorney misconduct, would correct the error. However, the
Court of Criminal Appeals has not subsequently cited this

94

Id. at 22.
See Brown, 2013 WL 6405736, at *2 (“The way the Whitehead
opinion is written, the two-prong inquiry is literally limited to
situations of attorney conduct.”)
96
Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 22.
95
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statement from Bush, and the Brown court’s error persists
in some appellate opinions.
Third, one might also notice how Bush handles the
tripartite pre-Whitehead due process tolling framework.
After describing the Holland test, the Bush court explained:
Prior to Whitehead, this
Court had tolled the postconviction deadline on due
process grounds in cases (1)
where the grounds for
overturning the conviction
arose after the statute of
limitations had run; (2) where
the prisoner was mentally
incompetent; and (3) where a
prisoner has been actively
misled
by
attorney
97
misconduct.
The supreme court then reasoned that Mr. Bush’s
claim could be construed as a Burford-style later-arising
claim, with the petitioner’s awareness that his rights had
been violated serving as the later-arising ground.98 But the
court held that even viewed through this lens, Mr. Bush
was not eligible for due process tolling because he was not
“diligently pursuing his rights under the first prong of the
Whitehead-Holland test.”99 At the risk of going out on a
limb, this paragraph could imply that a prisoner faced with
97

Id. at 23 (citing Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 623-24).
Id. As the Court explained, the violation of Mr. Bush’s rights (failure
to inform him of lifetime community supervision prior to a plea deal in
a sex-crime case) occurred before he was sentenced in 2001. Mr. Bush
learned about his lifetime community supervision sentence much later,
by December 2004. He failed to apply for post-conviction relief until
April 2011. Id.
99
Id.
98
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a Burford-style later-arising-grounds claim could toll the
statute of limitations by acting quickly once he or she
becomes aware of the later-arising grounds. Conversely,
this dicta could merely be the court offering an alternative
rationale for finding that Mr. Bush loses his appeal.
What can we gather from the supreme court’s
opinion in Bush? In this non-attorney-misconduct case, the
court began its analysis with the Whitehead-Holland test.
Only later did the court even list the three pre-Whitehead
tolling categories. Even when, toward the end of the
opinion, the court re-conceptualized the case as a species of
Burford later-arising-grounds claim, the court applied the
Whitehead-Holland test. The supreme court made clear in
Bush that the Whitehead-Holland test, not the ad hoc
framework, is the go-to rule for assessing post-conviction
due process tolling claims.
It is worth mentioning that Whitehead and Bush had
nothing to say about tolling claims that involve alleged
petitioner mental incompetence. While one could easily say
that mental incompetence is a “circumstance beyond the
petitioner’s control” that can thwart a timely petition, it
would be difficult to assess whether a mentally incompetent
petitioner is pursuing his or her rights diligently. This
observation is simply to note that petitioner mental
incompetence might be a free-standing ground for tolling,
and that the Whitehead-Holland test should govern all other
types of claims.100 For example, a person in a later-arisinggrounds case will be pursuing his or her rights diligently
when the petitioner acts quickly to take advantage of the
100

Two months before the publication of Whitehead, the Court
released Reid ex rel. Martiniano v. State, 396 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. 2013)
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 224 (2013), in which the Court clarified the
analysis used to determine petitioner mental incompetency in cases that
involve due process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations.
At this juncture Reid ex rel. Martiniano remains the governing case for
mental incompetence post-conviction cases.
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later-arising grounds, as the court’s analysis in Bush may
imply.
IV. Bush Unheeded: The Court of Criminal Appeals
Remains Divided on Whitehead
In Brown v. State, the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals suggested that the Whitehead-Holland test applied
only to due process tolling cases that are based on attorney
misconduct.101 But then, in Bush v. State, the Tennessee
Supreme Court clarified that the Whitehead-Holland test
“applies to all due process tolling claims, not just those that
concern alleged attorney misconduct.”102 The Tennessee
Supreme Court likely wrote this sentence specifically to
correct the Brown court’s misinterpretation of Whitehead v.
State. In Whitehead, the Supreme Court adopted a new,
two-pronged, one-size-fits-all test to analyzing postconviction due process tolling claims. This section will
examine the post-Bush cases in which the Court of
Criminal Appeals applied Whitehead. The focus will be to
determine whether the Tennessee Supreme Court
successfully corrected the Court of Criminal Appeals’
misplaced notion that the Whitehead-Holland test applies
only in tolling cases premised on alleged attorney
misconduct or negligence.
Between the publication of Bush v. State on January
28, 2014, and the writing of this article in November 2014,
the Court of Criminal Appeals released ten opinions
relevant to this discussion. Seven are from the Middle
Section,103 one is from the Eastern Section,104 and two
101

Brown, 2013 WL 6405736, at *2.
Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 22.
103
Woodard v. State, No. M2013-01857-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL
4536641 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2014); King v. State, No. M201302505-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 2854804 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23,
2014); Kimbrough v. State, No. M2013-02536-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL
102
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come from the Western Section.105 The court held oral
arguments in only one of these cases,106 and Whitehead was
never mentioned in the arguments.107
A. Post-Bush Cases Based on Alleged Attorney
Negligence or Misconduct
It is useful to distinguish the post-Bush cases that
were based on alleged attorney error (six cases) from those
that were based on grounds other than alleged attorney
error (four cases). This section will consider the post-Bush
cases in which the petitioner sought equitable tolling based
on alleged attorney error. The earliest of these, Johnson v.
State,108 is the first post-Whitehead tolling case from the
Eastern Section. In this brief opinion, the Court of Criminal
Appeals applied the Whitehead-Holland test without
mentioning the old ad hoc categories and denied relief.109
The same can be said for the Middle Section’s opinion in

2592877 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2014); Rutherford v. State, No.
M2013-01575-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 1669960 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Apr. 25, 2014); Samuel v. State, No. M2013-01272-CCA-R3-PC, 2014
WL 1669963 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2014); Wong v. State, No.
M2013-01684-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 1369756 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Apr. 7, 2014); Morris v. State, No. M2013-01652-CCA-R3-PC, 2014
WL 1323617 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2014).
104
Johnson v. State, No. E2013-01464-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL
1118018 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2014).
105
Webb v. State, No. W2013-01250-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 4244028
(Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2014); Griffin v. State, No. W2013-01009CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 2941239 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2014).
106
Woodard, 2014 WL 4536641.
107
Oral arguments are available at http://tncourts.gov/courts/courtcriminal-appeals/arguments/2014/07/16/state-tennessee-v-denniscedric-woodard.
108
Johnson v. State, No. E2013-01464-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL
1118018 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2014).
109
Id. at *2.
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Wong v. State.110 Neither of these opinions is at odds with
Whitehead and Bush.
In Samuel v. State,111 however, a panel from the
Middle Section adopted verbatim the boilerplate
description of Whitehead from Morgan and Lackey.112 In
other words, the Court of Criminal Appeals said that
Whitehead “identified three circumstances” in which tolling
was warranted, i.e., the three old ad hoc categories.113 But
the court blunted this potential misreading by stating,
“Essentially, due process serves to toll the post-conviction
statute of limitations for petitioners who face circumstances
beyond their control, such as the above numerated
circumstances, which preclude them from actively raising
their post-conviction claims.”114 The court then quoted the
Whitehead-Holland test and applied the test to find that
tolling was not warranted.115 The most generous reading of
Samuel is that the Court of Criminal Appeals says the three
ad hoc categories are examples of circumstances in which
the Whitehead-Holland test has historically been met.
While this is not an incorrect approach to Whitehead, it
would be better for the appellate court to begin with the
Whitehead-Holland test, as the supreme court did in
Bush.116

110

Wong v. State, No. M2013-01684-CCA-RE-PC, 2014 WL 1369756,
at *3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2014).
111
Samuel v. State, No. M2013-01272-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL
1669963 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2014).
112
See the discussion supra, Part II.
113
Samuel, 2014 WL 1669963, at *2. The Samuel court also noted that
the “attorney misconduct” rationale also applied to “possible
misrepresentation by prison officials.” Id. (citing Alderson v. State, No.
M2010-00896-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 4888137 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Nov. 30, 2010)).
114
Id.
115
Id. at *3, *6.
116
See supra, Part III.
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The fourth alleged attorney error case is Kimbrough
v. State,117 written by the author of Samuel, Morgan, and
Lackey. The Kimbrough court applied the WhiteheadHolland test, but its analysis implied that the test only
applies “when the claim is predicated on attorney
misconduct.”118 Applying Whitehead, the court found no
diligent pursuit and no extraordinary circumstance.119
The analysis in Webb v. State120 is similar. The
petitioner in Webb sought due process tolling on two
grounds – attorney misconduct and mental incompetence.
The appellate court’s analysis began by citing Whitehead
for the “three circumstances” the Tennessee Supreme Court
“identified” that warrant tolling. The court found that Mr.
Webb had “raised the second and third circumstances.”121
When the court turned to the attorney misconduct question,
it implied that the Whitehead-Holland test applied only to
attorney error claims.122 Moreover, the court relied on a
statement from Williams and Smith that Whitehead
expressly overruled:
“Short
of
active
misrepresentation, however,
[the supreme court has] never
held that trial or appellate
117

Kimbrough v. State, No. M2013-02536-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL
2592877 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2014).
118
See id. at *2.
119
Id. at *3.
120
Webb v. State, No. W2013-01250-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 4244028,
at*3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2014).
121
Id. at *3.
122
Id. at *4 (“To toll the statute of limitations for attorney misconduct
or abandonment, a petitioner must make ‘a showing (1) that he or she
has been pursuing his or her rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his or her way and prevented
timely filing.’”) Id. (citing Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 631 (citing
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648-49 (2010))).
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counsel’s inadvertent or
negligent failure to inform his
or her client of the right to
file a post-conviction petition
constitutes
ineffective
assistance
of
counsel”
sufficient to toll the statute of
limitations in post-conviction
proceedings.123
Here, the appellate court seems unaware that the supreme
court overruled its earlier “artificial and unhelpful
distinction” between “active misrepresentation” and
negligence in Whitehead.124
In the recent case of Woodard v. State, the Court of
Criminal Appeals remanded an untimely petition for an
evidentiary hearing.125 Mr. Woodard sought due process
tolling on two bases. First, Mr. Woodard said his attorney
failed to inform him for almost two years that his
application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee
Supreme Court had been denied.126 Second, Mr. Woodard
made a later-arising ground claim that he presented in the
form of a writ of error coram nobis: Mr. Woodard said he
did not learn until 2012 that his trial attorney had
committed malpractice by simultaneously representing (and
allegedly coaching) one of the witnesses against him at his
murder trial.127
In its analysis, the Woodard court began with
Whitehead, but stated that the Whitehead opinion
123

Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 358 (Tenn. 2011);
citing Williams, supra note 7 at 468 n.7 (Tenn. 2001) (alteration in
original)).
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See Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 631.
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Woodard v. State, No. M2013-01857-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL
4536641 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2014).
126
Id. at *5.
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Id. at *6.
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“identified three scenarios” that require tolling. The court
cited the Whitehead-Holland test, but implied that the test
applies only to attorney misconduct cases.128 The court
determined that an evidentiary hearing was necessary in
“the interests of justice,” especially when Mr. Woodard
appeared to have been “pursuing his rights diligently.”129
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ postBush attorney misconduct cases therefore contain two cases
that apply the Whitehead-Holland test without mentioning
the ad hoc categories and four cases that begin with the ad
hoc categories and apparently situate the WhiteheadHolland test within category three. The appellate court’s
approach is not uniform.
B. Post-Bush Tolling Cases Not Premised on
Attorney Error.
There are four post-Bush cases in which the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals considered due
process tolling claims founded on bases other than alleged
attorney negligence or misconduct. These cases deserve
special attention because if the Court of Criminal Appeals
applied the Whitehead-Holland test to a non-attorney case,
this would indicate an awareness that the Whitehead rule is
not limited strictly to tolling claims premised on attorney
error. Again, none of these cases makes reference to the
Bush opinion’s clarification of the scope of the WhiteheadHolland test. Three of these opinions are at odds with Bush,
but the final case appears to get it right.
Morris v. State130 from the Middle Section of the
Court of Criminal Appeals only addresses Whitehead
128

Id. at *9.
Id. at *11.
130
Morris v. State, No. W2013-01652-CCA-R3PC, 2014 WL 1323617,
at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 2014), appeal denied (Tenn. June 25,
2014). The petitioner’s grounds for due process tolling in Morris are
129
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briefly, and when it does so, it makes the same error as the
pre-Bush cases of Morgan and Lackey and the post-Bush
cases of Samuel and Rutherford.131 The court in Morris
states that in Whitehead,
the Tennessee Supreme Court
identified three circumstances
in which due process requires
tolling the limitations period:
(1) claims for relief that arise
after the statute of limitations
has expired; (2) claims
involving prisoners whose
mental
incompetence
prevents
them
from
complying
with
the
procedural deadline; and (3)
claims in which attorney
misconduct resulted in the
delay in filing the petition.
Petitioner argues that he was
unaware that his conviction
could be used to enhance
punishment in subsequent
cases. This is not one of the
circumstances that would
require tolling of the statute
of limitations.132
The appellate court never cites the Holland test in this
opinion. The Morris opinion is, therefore, another Court of
unclear, although the grounds do not appear to involve any allegation
of attorney negligence or misconduct.
131
The author of the Morris opinion was on the panel that decided
Samuel and Rutherford. Id.
132
Id. at *2.
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Criminal Appeals opinion at odds with the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s tolling analysis in Bush. Rather than
applying the Whitehead-Holland test as the Tennessee
Supreme Court has instructed, the appellate court
approached the tolling issue by asking whether the
petitioner’s claim could be located within one of the old
pre-Whitehead ad hoc categories. The Tennessee Supreme
Court abrogated this approach in Whitehead, as it made
clear in Bush.133
The second post-Bush non-attorney case is
Rutherford v. State,134 released the same day as the attorney
misconduct case of Samuel and decided by the same panel.
Written by the same judge who wrote Samuel, Morgan, and
Lackey, the Rutherford opinion contains the same
boilerplate description of Whitehead which claims that
Whitehead “identified three circumstances” in which due
process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations
is warranted.135 The Court of Criminal Appeals in
Rutherford does allude to the Whitehead-Holland test (the
language is identical to language in Samuel),136 but the
court’s analysis focuses on whether the petitioner’s tolling
claim fits within one of the three (now four)137 ad hoc
categories.138 The analysis in Rutherford is therefore at
odds with Bush.
133

See Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 22. (“[The Whitehead-Holland] rule
applies to all due process tolling claims, not just those that concern
alleged attorney misconduct.”) Id.
134
Rutherford v. State, No. M2013-01575-CCA-R3PC, 2014 WL
1669960, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2014).
135
Id. at *2.
136
Id.
137
The fourth category is the Alderson situation, in which the petitioner
alleges misrepresentation by prison officials. Id.
138
Id. at *3 (“The petitioner has not presented a later-arising claim,
makes no allegation of mental incompetence precluding the raising of
the issues, no allegations of attorney misconduct, and no allegations of
interference by prison author[it]ies.”) Id.
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The third case in this category is King v. State,139
decided by the Middle Section (like Morris and
Rutherford). The analysis in King is by now familiar.
“[O]ur supreme court,” the court says, “has identified three
circumstances in which due process requires tolling the
post-conviction statute of limitations.”140 Mr. King’s tolling
claim was based on a lack of access to legal materials at his
local correctional facility’s library. The Court of Criminal
Appeals found no need to determine whether this would
“constitute a fourth circumstance” that warranted due
process tolling.141 The court did not quote, cite, or consider
the Whitehead-Holland test. This silence by itself suggests
the court believed, as in Brown, that the test applied only to
tolling claims premised on attorney error.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals delivered
a better analysis in Griffin v. State,142 decided by the
Western Section in late June 2014. Like the petitioner in
Brown,143 Mr. Griffin claimed his petition was late because
his facility was on administrative lockdown for several
days in April 2011.144 The Griffin court’s analysis is
superior to that in Morris, Rutherford, and King because
the court goes straight to the Whitehead-Holland test and
does not bother with trying to locate the administrative
lockdown within one of the old ad hoc tolling categories.145
Applying Whitehead, the Court of Criminal Appeals
declined to toll the statute of limitations.146
139

King v. State, No. M2013-02505-CCA-R3PC, 2014 WL 2854804,
at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2014).
140
Id. at *3.
141
Id.
142
Griffin v. State, No. W2013-01009-CCA-R3PC, 2014 WL 2941239,
at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2014).
143
Brown, 2013 WL 6405736, at *1, discussed supra, Part II.
144
Griffin, 2014 WL 2941239, at *1. Mr. Griffin specified that the
reason for the lockdown was “inclement weather.” Id.
145
See id. at *3.
146
Id. at *4.
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With Griffin, the Court of Criminal Appeals finally
applied the Whitehead-Holland test without first
considering the ad hoc categories to a tolling claim that was
not premised on attorney error. It remains to be seen
whether future cases will hew to the narrow reading of
Whitehead that persists within the Court of Criminal
Appeals’ due process tolling jurisprudence, or whether
Griffin is the true harbinger of things to come.
V. Concluding Remarks
In Whitehead v. State,147 the Tennessee Supreme
Court eliminated its previous distinction between attorney
negligence and willful misconduct and also abrogated the
ad hoc approach to due process tolling. The court embraced
the test of Holland v. Florida as a one-size-fits-all rubric
for assessing post-conviction due process tolling claims.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has tended to
misread Whitehead. Rather than wielding the Holland test
as the multi-tool it really is, the Court of Criminal Appeals
persists in citing the portion of Whitehead in which the
Tennessee Supreme Court described the way things used to
be. The Court of Criminal Appeals often begins its analyses
by expounding the three categories that defined the
boundaries of due process tolling prior to Whitehead.
Further, the court has circumscribed the scope of the
Whitehead-Holland test by confining its use to attorney
misconduct cases. The Tennessee Supreme Court noticed
this error and clarified in Bush v. State that the WhiteheadHolland test “applies to all due process tolling claims, not
just those that concern alleged attorney misconduct.”148 But
the Court of Criminal Appeals has never cited this language
or any other part of the Bush Court’s application of
Whitehead.
147
148

Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 631 (Tenn. 2013).
Bush, 428 S.W.3d at 22 (Tenn. 2014).
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This article’s ambition has been to make clear that –
with the possible exception of petitioner mental
incompetence claims – claims for due process tolling of the
Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act’s one-year
statute of limitations should be analyzed under the two-step
Whitehead-Holland test regardless of the specific basis of
the claim. The practical effect is that petitioners will be free
to point to any circumstance beyond their control that
thwarted their otherwise diligent efforts to file their
petitions on time. Although the bar one must clear to obtain
due process tolling is still incredibly high,149 Tennessee
courts are no longer straightjacketed by an ever-growing
list of narrowly defined pigeonholes into which they must
stick a tolling claim before tolling is possible. The
Tennessee Supreme Court in Whitehead made a sagacious
decision to adopt a flexible test that was already being
deftly utilized by courts across the country. The new rule
promotes fairness, and lower courts and practitioners would
do well to embrace it in all its breadth.

149

As the Tennessee Supreme Court has emphasized,
[D]ue process tolling must be
reserved for those rare instances
where – due to circumstances
external to the
party’s
own
conduct
–
it
would
be
unconscionable to enforce the
limitation period against the party
and
gross injustice would
result. The threshold for triggering
this form of relief is very high, lest
the exceptions swallow the rule.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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ARTICLE
JUDICIAL LEADERSHIP IN FAMILY COURT: A
CAUTIONARY TALE
By: Jane M. Spinak*
Charles Miller Endowed Lecture
University of Tennessee College of Law
For the past 35 years I have been practicing in,
teaching, and writing about the Family Court. The problemsolving court movement in the last two decades – with its
proliferation of drug courts, mental health courts, and
veterans courts, to name a few – renewed my interest in the
historical roots of the family court because of the parallels
between the original juvenile court and the recent problem
solving court movement. One of the key elements—
perhaps the defining element—in both is the role of the
judge as the leader of the court. That is what I want to
focus on today. I’ve called this talk a cautionary tale; what
I mean is that the idea of judicial leadership as it developed
in the juvenile and family court historically, and as it is still
being applied in those courts and in the newer problem
solving courts today, is based on an idealized conception of
the judge that has never been true and is unlikely ever to be
true. Consequently, building a court around this idealized
notion of the judicial leader is a dangerous proposition.

*

Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law
School. I would like to thank the faculty, staff , and students of the
University of Tennesse College of Law for their warm welcome last
April to Knoxville, especially Professors Wendy Bach and Valerie
Vojdik for inviting me, Professor Penny White for asking to publish
this lecture, and Dean Doug Blaze for facilitating such interesting
conversations during my visit.
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We’ll begin with the words of a contemporary
family court leader. Judge Leonard Edwards received the
2004 William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence,
bestowed each year by the National Center for State Courts
to a state court judge who “exemplifies the highest level of
judicial excellence, integrity, fairness, and professional
ethics.”150 Judge Edwards, a distinguished and dedicated
family court judge from California, is the first and only
juvenile or family court judge to receive the award, a
testament to his national leadership on behalf of these
courts. Here are his words:
Judges in the juvenile court
are charged with keeping
children
safe;
restoring
families; finding permanency
for children; and holding
youth, families, and service
providers accountable . . . We
have to convene child- and
family-serving
agencies,
schools, and the community
around the problems facing
our most vulnerable and
troubled children . . . The role
of the juvenile court judge is
unlike any other. In the
traditional
judicial
role,
deciding a legal issue may
complete the judge’s task;
however, in deciding the
future of a child or family
150

Leonard P. Edwards, Remarks of Judge Edward P. Leonards at the
Presentation of the William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence (Nov. 18, 2004), in 5 J. CENTER FAM. CHILDREN & CTS.
169, 169 (2004).

48

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 49
member, the juvenile court
judge must, in addition to
making a legal decision, be
prepared to take on the role
of an administrator, a
collaborator, a convener, and
an advocate.151
Judge Edwards is proud that the family court judge is not
limited to the traditional judicial role of legal decisionmaker, but instead given broad responsibility for children
and families, which requires each judge to be an
administrator, collaborator, convener and advocate. Judge
Edwards’ award was presented in the Great Hall of the
United States Supreme Court and Judge Edwards took the
opportunity to remind his august audience of the critical
work done by his colleagues throughout the country while
also lamenting how infrequently the Court has
acknowledged that work. Judge Edwards carefully
sidesteps the severe chastisement that the Court had
delivered in several of its most famous juvenile cases, such
as In re Gault and Mckeiver v. Pennsylvania, where the
Court criticized the work of many of his colleagues as it
struggled to define the proper role of the juvenile court
judge, expressing uncertainty whether the multiplicity of
roles that Judge Edwards heralds can be filled by the mere
mortals who become family court judges.
These multiple roles are a departure from the
impartial, restrained and objective judge in the common
law tradition and shift judicial responsibility from
individualized legal determinations to a broader conception
of judicial leadership. As the ultimate authority in the
courtroom, judges in all trial courts today assume a
leadership role to make sure the case moves along
151

Id. at 170.
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expeditiously, that due process protections are upheld, and
that everyone in the courtroom is doing his or her job.
Professor Judith Resnik calls this modern decision-maker
the “managerial judge.”152
The family court judge,
however, is given a different managerial role. As defined
in the New York Family Court Act, the family court judge
is given “a wide range of powers for dealing with the
complexities of family life so that its action may fit the
particular needs of those before it.”153
As the myriad proceedings concerning families
have become increasingly consolidated into a single court
system – a unified family court in many states – the role of
the judge as the leader inside and outside the courtroom has
intensified. The trajectory toward unification and greater
judicial authority over all aspects of family conflict within
a single judicial decision-maker raises significant questions
about the ability of the judge to balance his or her ability to
make impartial and fair determinations while using the
extensive discretion granted to the court to “fit the
particular needs of those before it.”154 The family court
unification movement, which began in earnest in the
middle of the twentieth century and continues today, is the
most important development since the juvenile court’s
creation. The movement, however, has resisted the
historical lessons of judicial leadership in its predecessor
courts, which provide a cautionary tale against
consolidating too much power in one judge. Even in
Tennessee, where a unified system has not been adopted,
juvenile court jurisdiction extends to dependency, status
offenses, delinquency, custody, termination of parental
rights, paternity, support and other related issues. Without
unification, judges with juvenile court jurisdiction here
have tremendous authority over the intersecting issues that
152

Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 141 (McKinney 2008).
154
Id.
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bring families before them. Later, I will distinguish
between the administrative advantages of unification and
the disadvantages of situating too much power within a
single decision-maker. First, let us look at the similarities
between Judge Edwards’ description of his role and the
words used by of some of the founders of the juvenile court
to understand better the historical underpinnings of the
judge’s role.
In his remarks Judge Edwards said: “We are the
legal equivalent of an emergency room in the medical
profession. We intervene in crises and figure out the best
response on a case-by-case, individualized basis.”155 At the
beginning of the 20th century, juvenile court judges were
similarly described as “doctor-counselors” or “judicial
therapists” who “[are] specialists in the art of human
relations.”156 The judge’s task was to “get the whole truth
about a child” like “a physician searches for every detail
that bears on the condition of a patient.”157 The medical
metaphor is in stark contrast to a judge who is being asked
to determine whether a child committed a crime or a parent
is neglectful. Those determinations rely on evidence of
acts and intent rather than what the best response to those
acts might be. Judge Harvey Humphrey Baker, the first
judge of the Boston juvenile court, uses medical metaphors
to explain why the juvenile court doesn’t “confine its
attention to just the particular offense which brought the
child to its notice.”158 Judge Baker believed “it is helpful to
think of [court officials] as physicians in a dispensary,”159
referring to both the physical arrangement of a juvenile
155

Edwards, supra note 150 at 170.
Anthony M. Platt, THE CHILD SAVERS 142 (1969).
157
Id. at 142-43.
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Harvey H. Baker, The Procedure of the Boston Juvenile Court, in
HARVEY HUMPHREY BAKER, UPBUILDER OF THE JUVENILE COURT 114
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court but also to the way in which the court conducts its
business:
In
determining
the
disposition to be made of the
case the procedure of the
physician is very closely
followed . . . The judge and
probation officer consider
together, like a physician and
his junior, whether the
outbreak which resulted in
the arrest of the child was
largely accidental, or whether
it is habitual or likely to be
so; whether it is due chiefly
to some inherent physical or
moral defect of the child, or
whether some feature of his
environment is an important
factor; and then they address
themselves to the question of
how permanently to prevent
the recurrence.160
Even Judge Baker knew the limitations of the analogy,
recognizing that a child did not come voluntarily to the
court as a patient comes to a dispensary. And while a
doctor may have a duty to minimize pain, the judge and
probation officer “from time to time deliberately cause the
child discomfort, because the discomfort of punishment
affords in some cases an indispensible stimulus or moral
tonic which cannot be supplied in any other way.”161

160
161

Id. at 114.
Id. at 116.
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This medical metaphor does not fit well into the
common law tradition where the judge’s “sole duty is to
determine under the law and the facts the questions
presented.”162 Some judges at the time suggested that the
juvenile court seemed better suited to the investigative
tradition of civil law countries.163 Judge Willis B. Perkins,
a prosecutor and later a Michigan Circuit judge early in the
20th Century, urged adoption of the inquisitorial tradition of
the civil law courts of continental Europe to allow the judge
to scrutinize deeply into the family’s life. Judge Perkins
said:
The judge of a family court
must have larger powers than
these. He must be at liberty to
investigate or cause to be
investigated every anti-social
or abnormal act growing out
of family disturbances. His
duties must necessarily be
inquisitorial
rather
than
accusatory . . . To empower a
judge to act on his own
initiative immediately and
without
pleadings;
to
authorize him to become the
general
supervisor
and
mentor of the home and its
several occupants, will be a
new
thing
in
our
jurisprudence.164
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Willis B. Perkins, Family Courts, 17 MICH. L. REV. 378, 380
(1919).
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Id.
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Id. at 381.
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Judge Perkins was nevertheless concerned that society
would not tolerate these “tyrannical methods unless they
are fruitful of good results,” so he set the standard for this
new kind of judicial officer very high:
It is apparent, therefore, that
a judge who is given these
extraordinary powers must be
a man well versed in the law,
of
large
experience,
unswerving firmness, broad
sympathies, and clear, quick
and accurate judgments.
Wanting in any of these
elements, his work must
fail.165
The tension between setting extraordinary high
standards for judges implementing this foreign, even
tyrannical, process and worrying that they will fail to meet
those standards pervades the history of the court.
Julian W. Mack, a founder of the juvenile court and
one of its most famous jurists, put it this way:
I know – and the other judges
have told me the same thing –
that the good people of the
community think that every
judge of the juvenile court
must necessarily be a fine
fellow, filled with the
wisdom of the ages, capable
of dealing with all the

165

Id.
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children that come before
him.166
Like Judge Edwards nearly a century later, Judge Mack
conceived:
[T]he duty of the juvenile
court judge [is] to go out into
his community, if not into the
larger community of the
country at
large,
and
stimulate and arouse the
people to a sense of their
obligation to the wards who
come into his immediate
care, as it is to sit daily on his
bench and deal with those
individual children.167
Both Judge Mack and Judge Edwards fulfilled those duties,
lecturing widely, writing about their experiences, sitting on
local and national commissions and serving as models of
great jurists. With hindsight, Judge Mack admits that this
fine fellow is less perfect than the community thought:
That sort of a genius does not
exist. He may in the course of
time,
through
unusual
experience and opportunity,
gain considerable wisdom . . .
But few judges are really
temperamentally fitted, and
few are so eminently
166

Julian W. Mack, The Chancery Procedure in Juvenile Court, in THE
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endowed as to be able to do
the juvenile work and the
probation work and all the
other work that must be done
if the court is to be really
successful.168
Judge Mack made this observation only twenty-five
years after the juvenile court was founded and only a few
years after Judge Perkins’ comparable reflection. Yet, the
narrative of this extraordinary judicial creature is
undiminished in Judge Edwards’ remarks almost a century
later. This may be, in part, because Judge Edwards
embraces a version of the judge who is rightly more
constrained by statutory limitations and constitutional due
process protections today and therefore not quite the same
“fine fellow” the early court employed.169 Even so, the
judge’s role as a leader continues to define the court today,
even as the medicalized juvenile court evolved into a
family court more tethered to the law. This evolution
began in earnest in the middle of the 20th Century. I would
like to use the example of creating the unified family court
in New York to illustrate the enduring power of judicial
leadership 50 years after the juvenile court was founded
before turning to its enduring power today.
In 1953, Alfred Kahn published what was called a
“controversial and provocative” report, A Court for
Children, about the New York City Children’s Court.170
Dr. Kahn received the first doctorate in social welfare
issued in New York State by writing a dissertation that
would later become this report. He taught at the Columbia
School of Social Work for 57 years and became world
168
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famous for his work on children and families. Kenneth
Johnson, then Dean of the Columbia School of Social
Work, wrote in the Foreword of Kahn’s report that “[i]t
gives us facts which are not sugarcoated and which are not
pleasant to take.”171 The following year, the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York issued a special report,
Children and Families in the Courts of New York City,
written by another Columbian, Professor Walter
Gellhorn.172 Gellhorn incorporated some of Dr. Kahn’s
research and insight into his own report and
recommendations. Both Dr. Kahn and Professor Gellhorn
were at the end of their careers by the time I came to
Columbia and long past thinking about family court, but I
knew them both and admired them immensely. As I’ve
worked on a book about family court, of which this talk is
part of a chapter, I feel their ghosts hovering about my
shoulders, urging me along.
By the time their reports were written, courts for
children and families had moved far beyond the original
juvenile court, addressing various issues of family
functioning including neglect and abuse, termination of
parental rights, and all aspects of domestic relations. Some
states continued to separate delinquency from other areas of
jurisdiction but many combined family issues within
specialized courts or court divisions.173 By 1949, the
national model Standard Juvenile Court Act recommended
that courts for children and families should have
jurisdiction over all family issues.174 Gellhorn’s report
agreed with that recommendation, ultimately concluding
that New York families would be better served by a unified
171
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family court.175 His recommendation was adopted by a
special City Bar Committee and led, in part, to the passage
of the 1962 New York Family Court Act, which combines
most, but not all, family proceedings in one unified Family
Court.176
Despite Gellhorn’s strong belief in unifying
jurisdiction over family matters in the new court, he
resisted recommending that the highly successful “school
part” of the Children’s Court merge into the unified court.
Gellhorn was impressed with the expertise of the four
school part judges and with the fact that children did not
seem to feel stigmatized by attending the school part. He
feared that the helping functions that seemed so successful
in the school part were not sufficiently understood nor
implemented by the bench in the rest of the Children’s
Court. Gellhorn concluded that the school part should
remain a separate entity until the community supported —
and the bench fully embraced—the helping function of the
new court that he saw exemplified by the judges of the
school part.
When Gellhorn conducted his study in the early
1950’s, his conclusion that the disjointed ways in which
child and family problems were parsed out to at least six
different courts and several divisions of those courts led
easily to a conclusion this was not a productive way to get
the work done. For Gellhorn, who is credited as one of the
creators of modern administrative law and who cared
deeply that fairness and due process were imbedded into
administrative processes, a unified Family Court was
necessary for that job. Efficiency was a by-product of his
conclusions or, as he puts it more artfully, “[t]here is more
to this suggestion than a mere aesthetic impulse to create an
orderly pattern. It rests on the solid proposition that
175
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familial controversy can best be handled by judges who
specialize in the family.”177
A comprehensive family court would allow the
judge to provide an opportunity for the family to address
their problems in a constructive (rather than punitive) way
while using “skills drawn from the social and biological
sciences.”178 Staff would be trained in these skills and
judges would have to be willing to adopt this approach.
Judges should not be assigned to the court unless they are
“particularly understanding of the methods it must employ”
and if assignments to the court were to be rotated among
judges, they need enough stability to learn this
methodology and to develop relationships with the other
staff.179
Gellhorn’s point, throughout the study, is that the
many courts that address family issues are not set up to do
this well. He also has no doubt that many judges in the
courts he reviewed are not suited for the unified family
court he is proposing. Gellhorn does not doubt, however,
that suitable judges can be found and trained to do the
work. He remains optimistic that combining the right
organizational structure with the right personnel will
produce an effective court where “modern methods are
brought to bear on modern problems.”180 Within ten years,
the New York State Family Court had been created,
shifting most jurisdictional authority over family issues into
one unified court system. The Family Court Act also
addressed what Gellhorn had earlier proposed: “that legal
training and experience should be required before any
person may assume the office of family court judge… [and]
Judges of the family court should also be familiar with
areas of learning and practice that often are not supplied by
177
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the practice of law.”181 Like the judges of the Children’s
Court school part, judges so trained would be the judicial
leaders that Gellhorn envisioned for the new court.
Gellhorn was very careful to minimize his concerns about
the quality of the judges he was observing in his report. He
needed all the allies he could get for his ultimate unification
recommendations. His goal was to change the structure of
the system and, by doing so, he believed he would also
change the quality of the judiciary.
Modern
interdisciplinary education and better organization would
make better judges.
Dr. Kahn, the social scientist, was less convinced
that structural change was the main impediment to an
effective family court judge. He certainly agreed that
judges with specialized knowledge in a better-structured
and resourced court would do a better job. Kahn could not
avert his eyes, however, from how judges use the
jurisdictional authority that they’ve been given. His core
concern is that “in too many instances, consciously or by
implication” many Children’s Court judges “see themselves
as the Court.”182 Moreover, the litigants see the judge as
the Court: “For the majority of parents and children, the
significance of the entire court is largely decided on the
bench.” 183
Kahn wants to hold onto the idea of the juvenile
court, but he portends Justice Fortas’ concerns in Gault
about the lack of due process by more than a decade.184
Kahn believed that the judge lacks the legitimacy to enter
into the dispositional phase of a proceeding unless the
adjudicative phase incorporates the basic due process
protections of a common law court. Informality has its
181
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place in making families more comfortable in the court and
in integrating the opinions of the social service or mental
health experts involved, but informality is not a substitute
for fairness at either the adjudicative or dispositional phases
of hearings; nor is the judge’s innate sense of what to do.
As Kahn bluntly writes: “Judges are prone to a major
occupational hazard – the feeling that they can readily
appraise a situation and regularly make wise decisions not
subject to question.”185 A court with few lawyers, press
oversight or regular appellate review “lends itself
particularly to such hazards.” 186 Kahn finds these hazards
throughout his study: he recounts stories of judges chiding
children for bad spelling; for not going to church or
learning the Ten Commandments; of chastising parents for
their clothes or demeanor; and for issuing orders that will
change peoples’ lives without ever looking up from the
bench. One story recounts the judge calling a young boy
into the courtroom to introduce him for the first time to his
putative father and then sending him home to live with
him! These stories don’t include the various punishments
judges regularly meted out to their young charges.187 Kahn
recognizes these occupational hazards and urges restraint
on the use of the court’s power:
It is clear that, even within a
juvenile court concerned with
arranging treatment, the
process which considers
intervention (judicial steps)
must be carefully separated
procedurally from treatment
planning (disposition) since
185
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the court properly should
assert jurisdiction only in
clearly defined situations and
not simply because a judge
considers a particular child to
need treatment.188
The judge who is given the power to exercise such
instrumental authority must understand the grave
implications of that power in order to make wise findings
and proper dispositional orders. Kahn wants the judge to
be the leader of the court team that Judge Edwards
described in his 2004 speech, but most of the judges he
observes don’t define their roles in ways “consistent with
the intent of the law” or “fail to implement [the law]
successfully.”189 He reluctantly concludes, “[from] the
perspective of the aspirations of the juvenile court
movement and the expressed goals of court leadership, the
accomplishments are outweighed by the inadequacies.”190
Kahn was not alone in his assessment. A few years
after Kahn’s New York study was published, the fiftieth
anniversary of the juvenile court was commemorated by a
conference at the University of Chicago in 1959 and
resulted in a book of essays on the court called Justice for
the Child. Margaret Keeney Rosenheim, a professor and
Dean at Chicago’s School of Social Services
Administration, wrote in her essay contribution that
throughout the country, the first few judges to occupy the
juvenile court bench were men of outstanding reputation
whose prestige enhanced the work of the court staff and
guaranteed community interest and support for the new
institution. Yet within two decades of its establishment,
this promising institution had become the victim of
188
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criticism and attacks that have, in substance, continued to
the present.191
Whether those original judges were as outstanding
as Professor Rosenheim reminisces a half-century on, by
the middle of the 20th century the original juvenile court
was not fulfilling its founders’ aspirations, in large part
because of its reliance on a flawed system of judicial
leadership. This leads us inevitably toward the question I
pose today. If every family court judge can’t be Julian
Mack, Len Edwards or the four judges in the school part
that Walter Gellhorn so admired, what does it mean for
judicial leadership to continue to motivate the juvenile
court, the family court and the unified family court
movement? How can this serve as the foundation of the
new problem solving court movement?
Why do I
recommend caution?
I begin to answer this question with Kahn’s
conclusion that the family court judge must have a clearly
defined basis for legal intervention in family life prior to
ever asserting authority over the dispositional phase of a
proceeding, something Kahn calls treatment planning. In
other words, I start with where we draw the jurisdictional
line before a judge can intervene in a family’s life. Let’s
use status offenses, also called unruly children in
Tennessee, as an example. These acts are called status
offenses because only minors, not adults, can be held
responsible for being incorrigible, running away, being
truant, not listening to parents or other authorities, using
drugs, or getting drunk; what Professor Rosenheim called
in the 1970’s “juvenile nuisances”.192
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Today, the youth are called CHINS, PINS or JINS;
children, juveniles or persons in need of supervision. There
has always been significant disagreement about whether the
jurisdictional line should be drawn at actual criminal acts or
for acts that just really bother or worry us. Bringing a
youth to court for robbery or assault is very different than
bringing her to court for having sex or underage drinking.
States have drawn that line differently at different points in
their histories. Where the line is drawn affects when the
court is going to begin impacting the life of the child or
family.
States also distinguish among acts that may
constitute neglect, abuse, or a sufficient basis to terminate
parental rights. These political and cultural choices are
tempered by constitutional mandates protecting individual
liberty and family integrity. The United States Constitution
prohibits states from intervening in family life without
establishing that a family is unable to protect a child from
harm, neglect, abuse, or trouble. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that parents have fundamental rights in
raising their children, most recently declaring, “[I]t cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children."193 Unless a legally defined harm
can be established or a person voluntarily seeks the
assistance of the court, there is no authority for the judge to
intervene in the family’s life because she believes she can
make that family better.
The late Judge Robert W. Page, a New Jersey
Family Court judge who worked tirelessly for effective
family court reform, succinctly described the court’s legal
basis to intervene in a comprehensive unified family court
plan:
193

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).

64

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 65
A court derives its very
existence and the validity of
its orders from an initial
determination of a legal basis
to act. This is true regardless
of the substantial needs of
those who are affected most
by the decision. A good rule
of thumb is the more
substantial the need for
judicial involvement, the
more the need to be
substantial in finding the
legal basis. A legal basis
includes the findings of
jurisdiction and venue at the
onset, full respect of the
rights of due process, with
reasonable notice and an
opportunity for all to be
heard and adherence to all
statutes, court rules, case
precedents and established
legal and equitable principles.
The family court is no place
for either judicial scofflaws
or goodwill ambassadors
without portfolio.194
Once a legal basis is established and supported by
sufficient evidence that a youth committed a crime or that a
parent abused a child, the judge is then empowered to
assert the broad “treatment planning” powers to administer
194
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so-called “individualized justice,” or determining what is
best for a child or a family. When Judge Baker said in
1910, “The court does not confine its attention to just the
particular offense which brought the child to its notice,” he
was lauding the court’s ability to fix whatever is wrong
with the child or his family beyond the child’s misbehavior.
195
Today, judges retain significant dispositional discretion,
even if not the same unlimited authority used by Judge
Baker.
Constitutional
protections
and
statutory
requirements limit the freewheeling authority of earlier
generations of the court. Nevertheless, within those
limitations, the judge retains tremendous authority to craft
services and dispositions. How the judge exercises that
authority often defines the court and the role it takes in
family life.
Most states have created some type of family court
as either a separate court or a division of a trial court. The
jurisdictional authority granted to these courts, however,
continues to vary considerably. Some have comprehensive
jurisdiction over a broad range of family law matters and
are able to consolidate cases about the same family under
one judge or one “team” of court personnel that includes
the judge.196 The administrative impetus for consolidating
cases is to make the court more efficient by providing a
judicial forum with broad jurisdiction that centralizes court
activities and minimizes the need for litigants to appear in
multiple proceedings in multiple fora about the same or
overlapping issues. The most obvious example is that
divorce, custody, support and maintenance issues should be
heard in the same court, preferably by the same judge, with
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all the judicial officers having access to the same
information.
A less clear-cut instance of the need for “one
family/one judge” is when a youth is being charged with
delinquency and his mother has brought a domestic
violence case against her partner.
There may be
information relevant to whether the judge paroles the
youth, such as whether the mother can supervise the youth.
On the other hand, the judge might use that information to
justify detaining the youth because he doesn’t want the
youth to witness domestic violence or live in a home with a
lesbian mother and her partner, two reasons for taking away
the youth’s liberty that may be irrelevant to the issue of
parole.
This administrative impulse for efficiency through
unification, seen half a century earlier in Professor
Gellhorn’s report, has been attributed to Roscoe Pound’s
controversial call for consolidation of trials within a unified
trial court in 1906.197 Pound, the legendary Dean of
Harvard Law School, was pursuing efficiency and
conserving resources for an inefficient court system. Late
in his life, in 1959, Pound applied those same justifications
to the family court, hoping to eliminate what he called “the
waste of time, energy and money” in addressing multiple
family issues in a multitude of judicial and administrative
settings.198 Pound leaves to others “what that court should
be or may be, or do,” while he focuses more on the court
within his broader goal of eliminating multiple tribunals as
part of modern court organization.199 Pound, nevertheless,
197
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sees this court as shouldering some of the work previously
done by other social organizations, like the church, in
deterring bad behavior and encouraging civilized society in
an increasingly heterogeneous and urban landscape.200
In leaving to others “what that court should be or
may be, or do,” Pound sidesteps the second impulse of
court unification, the therapeutic role of the court “to make
the emotional life of families and children better.”201 This
is the impulse of judicial leadership that I have cautioned
against.
In the current unification movement, the
therapeutic role of the court is manifested in two ways:
whether services to litigants are provided within or by the
court and in what way does the judge participate in creating
or monitoring the impact of any therapeutic intervention.
As part of the court’s statutory responsibilities in a
large array of cases, the judge issues orders that include
requiring family members to seek or secure assistance to
address the problems that allegedly led to court
intervention. These requirements could come at the very
beginning of a case, when the court sets conditions for a
youth’s parole after being charged with delinquency;
conditions for unsupervised visits when a child is removed
from a parent charged with neglect, or limitations on access
to the family home after allegations of domestic violence.
A youth could also be ordered to attend an afterschool
program as a condition of parole, a parent may be required
to comply with drug screening to be permitted visitation, or
a spouse may be precluded from the home without a third
party present. The court may also be statutorily mandated
to send disputing parties to mediation or other dispute
resolution mechanisms prior to adjudicating a custody case.
The scope of the court’s power to order the litigants
to comply with these types of behavioral requirements
increases dramatically once the court determines that a
200
201

Id. at 539.
Schepard, supra note 197 at 339.

68

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 69
youth is guilty, a parent has been neglectful, or domestic
violence has occurred. Dispositional orders in these cases
could include probation, secure residential placement,
foster care, substance abuse or psychiatric treatment, or
anger management therapy. While some of these services
can only be provided by specialized agencies, many, like
substance abuse treatment or testing, parent training or
education, mediation or case conferencing, are services that
could be provided in-house by court-related or courtdirected service systems.
From the very beginning, many of the juvenile
court’s founders wanted the youth to receive whatever help
they needed at the courthouse itself. Probation officers or
social workers who were part of the court staff would
provide supervision or counseling or other assistance
directly to the young person.202 Some court reformers were
uncomfortable with courts being service providers, urging
instead a clearer line between the judge’s authority to order
a service and the provision of that service by an executive
branch agency or an independent provider.203
Recent calls for a unified family court include
centralizing services within the court again, minimizing
concern about blurring the boundaries between the court’s
power to order a disposition and the subsequent
implementation of that order.204 Instead, the proponents
focus on reducing multiple locations or service providers
for families and on developing a more holistic approach to
the families’ needs under the court’s auspices.205
202
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There are many concerns with the revived model of
court-based services. First, there is the traditional objection
that a court is not a social services agency and should not
act as one. The judge’s role is to make the determination
that a service is necessary by considering the evidence
presented. If the judge determines the service needs to be
ordered, it should be. What happens if the service is part of
the court itself and then there is a dispute over whether the
youth or parent has complied with the service or the service
provider has delivered the service? If the service provider
is part of the court system the court may be unable to
impartially resolve the dispute. This is not theoretical.
Professor Melissa Breger has persuasively applied
the social psychology concept of “groupthink” to family
court practice. Breger notes that “[g]roupthink may be
defined as ‘a mode of thinking that people engage in when
they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the
members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation
to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.’”206
Courts, like all institutions, have a culture; a way of
doing things that often separates insiders from outsiders.207
An extensive study of criminal courts, found, “all
[criminal] courts have the same work to do in guaranteeing
justice and liberty, but they organize themselves differently
to accomplish these goals depending on their culture.208
Building on the criminal courts study, Professor Breger
considers how the culture of family court is especially
conducive to groupthink mentality.
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The family court’s traditional informality and
collegiality, the presence of the same institutional players
interacting over long periods of time, and the crisis nature
of so many of its cases, can undermine the independence of
the various players in the court system.
There is
tremendous pressure to reach consensus, not to rock the
boat by challenging court norms, and, especially, to keep
the judge happy.209 Breger identifies that, “Groups have a
predilection to achieve uniformity, which is often
embedded in members’ subconscious. This desire for
uniformity is specifically manifested in the context of a
leader who exerts subtle pressure on the group to achieve
consensus. In the family court context, this leader is the
judge.”210
Breger’s conclusions are directly applicable to the
question of whether service providers should be part of the
court system or independent. As part of the court system,
these providers interact routinely with court staff and the
judge. They learn the “rules” of the court, the way things
are supposed to work, and may be reluctant to challenge the
status quo. Court-based service providers may be more
compliant with the court’s view of a family than they
would if they were establishing an independent
relationship. Their opinion about a youth or a parent may
be given greater weight with less supporting evidence by a
judge who “trusts” the provider she sees everyday and who
knows what matters to the judge. This in turn may
reinforce a bias against an independent service provider’s
opinion when another opinion is sought.211
Outsiders, even those trying to help the judge make
a good decision, may be more loyal to their independent
professional obligations toward the litigant than an insider.
They may also have a different experience with the client
209
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outside of court, where the client may be more comfortable
and less anxious. This leads to the second reason for
separating services from the court, a litigant’s reluctance to
engage in services closely aligned to the court.
Court reformers who want to situate services within
the court rarely consider the negative impact this may have
on the way family members accept help. Little attention is
paid to how family members may feel about the court
generally and, specifically here, securing services within
the court system. The proponents of the unified family
court believe the court serves as a place for families to get
help. I do not. People come to the family court either
because they have to, such as when the state charges a
youth with a crime or a parent with mistreating his children
or not paying child support, or because the court is the only
or last remaining place to address their unresolved custody,
visitation, domestic violence, or paternity issues. If these
families could resolve disputes themselves or receive
readily available and appropriately crafted assistance in
their communities, they would come to court only when
they needed a legal judgment. This is because courts, even
family courts, are essentially coercive institutions.
Writing about the family court unification
movement in 2002, Professor Wallace Mylniec and Anne
Geraghty bluntly summarized their concern:
A court is, at its core, an
instrument of social control.
What it does best is resolve
disputed factual issues at a
point when the litigants
cannot resolve them by
themselves. Courts gain
control
over
these
acrimonious situations only
through the threat or reality
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of coercion. Thus, courts are
generally seen as an option of
last resort, somewhere for
people to go to resolve
serious disputes without
resort to violence, and a place
where society can assert its
control over behavior that it
considers too egregious to go
unpunished. Most people
who appear before a court do
not wish to be there, and
would have chosen another
form of dispute resolution
had it been possible.212
Mylniec and Geraghty focus on the fact that most litigants
in family court are indigent and do not view the process as
consensual. These litigants understand, instead, that if they
do not comply with court-ordered services,, the court can
apply even more coercive sanctions, including fewer visits
with their children, loss of custody, or even jail time.
When Judge Baker waxed eloquent about the
medical metaphor of the juvenile court in 1910, he
nevertheless acknowledged that court-ordered services had
a punitive component that “affords in some cases an
indispensible stimulus or moral tonic….”213 Kahn
acknowledged that an improved court incorporating legal
safeguards would still be “a refined instrument of social
control and treatment…”214 My colleague, Professor Philip
Genty, has written about the need for lawyers to empathize
212
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with indigent clients’ fear of the legal system. This
empathy requires “an understanding of the client’s deep
fear and mistrust of the very legal system upon which the
client must rely for a solution to her or his legal
problem.”215 This mistrust does not arise in a vacuum.
Most parents and youth begin the court process in
communities deeply suspicious of government intervention.
When services are in the courthouse, most litigants may
find it very difficult to distinguish between the power of the
judge to order their compliance with services and the courtrelated service provider trying to engage the litigant with
the service. When the service provider is so closely aligned
to the judge, can a parent say to the provider that she thinks
the judge’s decision was wrong? Will she admit to using
drugs even though she has clean urine tests? That she’s
angry with her child for reporting her to child protective
services? That she thinks mediation is a waste of time?
The litigant may or may not want to receive help. Yet, if
she does not work with the provider, what is the likelihood
that the parent will get her children back, her support
reinstated, or her order of protection renewed? In short,
how else could the parent get or keep the judge on her side?
While no court-ordered service is voluntary, a
parent may still feel she has more privacy to discuss these
issues with a service provider outside the court system,
maybe even someone she chose, or who may work in her
community and may be willing to assist her long after the
court case is done. She may feel that she has some say
about what is reported back to the court by a treatment
provider who is not part of “the system.” Or, as Kahn
noted in 1953, “[C]hildren and parents can better accept
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social services from other agencies than from courts which
have called them in on petition.”216
These two concerns about court-based services,
along with others, raise serious issues about the experiences
of litigants that court reformers have mostly ignored. In the
end, these concerns are only a structural manifestation of
the more fundamental question facing unified courts: how
the therapeutic impulse defines the role of the judge. When
we look at that impulse what we find is that the medical
model of the early 20th century juvenile court is
transforming into the therapeutic jurisprudence model of
the early 21st with all its attendant dangers.
Therapeutic jurisprudence, according to its
adherents, “looks at law as a social force that, like it or not,
may
produce
therapeutic
or
anti-therapeutic
consequences.”217 The way a law is written or a court is
organized or a judge acts impacts the well being of the
persons involved.
The proponents of therapeutic
jurisprudence want to raise awareness of the legal system’s
potential for good or harm as a system and encourage
reform efforts that strive to minimize the negative
experiences individuals have when they find themselves
immersed in legal processes. They want to add therapeutic
considerations into the mix of other important
considerations about legal processes including “autonomy,
integrity of the fact-finding process, and community
safety.”218 In the family law context, “therapeutic justice
should strive to protect families and children from present
216
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and future harms, to reduce emotional turmoil, to promote
family harmony or preservation, and to provide
individualized and efficient, effective family justice.”219
Creating a unified family court will accomplish that goal.
The words of the leading proponents of the movement are
unequivocal on that point:
Rather, it is that we seem to
be onto something good for
children
and
families,
something that helps people
secure basic necessities and
leaves them with the tools
necessary to do so long into
their respective futures. This
something is a unified family
court,
the
underlying
principle of which is the
practice
of
therapeutic
justice. Therapeutic justice
concentrates on empowering
families
with
skills
development, assisting them
in resolving their own
disputes,
enhancing
coordination of court events
within the justice system,
providing direct services to
families when and where they
need them, and building a
system of dispute resolution
that is more cost efficient,
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user-friendly,
conscious.220

and

time

I have advocated that
UFCs embrace the notions of
therapeutic jurisprudence and
an
ecological,
holistic
approach to the family’s
problems. In that vein, I have
advocated that specially
trained and interested judges
address not only the legal
issues, such as divorce,
custody, child support, and
domestic violence, but also
that they consider the
family’s nonlegal needs, such
as substance abuse, mental
health issues, or domestic
abuse. A therapeutic and
ecological UFC model allows
for the resolution of legal,
personal, emotional, and
social disputes with the aim
of improving the well-being
and functioning of families
and children.221
A
additional

UFC has an
and vital goal
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beyond simple, efficient
umpiring: to make the
emotional life of families and
children better…The UFC is
based on the premise that
family
members
are
interconnected emotionally,
economically, and spiritually.
Any court order about one
family member is likely to
affect
all.
Whatever
behavioral,
mental-health
problems, or conflict that
brought one family member
to court is likely caused or
influenced by other family
members. The legal label
attached to the case is less
important to the delivery of
therapeutic justice than the
ability of the court to make
appropriate orders to address
the underlying dynamics
causing the family to come to
the court's attention in the
first place.222
These three descriptions have in common several
therapeutic components: the court is capable of intervening
in a family’s life not just to resolve the legal dispute that
brought the family to court but to improve the family’s life
by addressing the complex social, emotional or
psychological issues underlying the dispute; when
therapeutic courts intervene in the lives of families, the
222
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outcomes for the families will improve; and, most centrally,
the court is a good place to resolve family problems. These
basic tenets of the unified family court sound remarkably
like the therapeutic justifications for the original juvenile
court. Our brief historical review of judicial leadership in
the juvenile and family court systems, however, has never
found these therapeutic attempts to be successful on a
systemic level. Of course, a particular judge or a particular
program may work well for a while, such as those school
part judges in New York in the 1950’s or Judges Mack or
Edwards, because they are being run by exceptional,
committed judges and have received additional funding and
other resources. The few investigations into how unified
courts are working now, however, only show that there are
some administrative improvements in the way the court
works or some improved outcomes from consolidation of
court cases, not that a therapeutic approach is effective.223
This matters for fundamental reasons. Choosing to
create a court based on therapeutic principles means that
other principles, such as fairness or due process, may be
given less value., A judge being asked to help solve a
family’s problems may be less concerned about each
litigant having legal counsel or following strict evidentiary
standards or even reaching a decision based on the
In considering the role of therapeutic
evidence.224
jurisprudence in family court, Judge Gerald W. Hardcastle
recently wrote:
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Therapeutic justice implies
the court system will not only
resolve litigants’ disputes but
also
will
resolve
the
underlying
dysfunctions
existing in the litigants and
the families. It also implies
the judges know the “right”
answer. As a result, the
process is not about judicial
discretion. In complex social
relationships, the judge is
charged with finding the right
answers
and
accepts
responsibility for finding
those answers - keeping the
parties before the court until
answers are found. It is an
arrogant, ambitious task.225
Moreover, it is a task that puts at risk the trust that litigants
try to have in a fair process. Shifting from a neutral judge
to a “’healer’ or ‘participant in the process’ or a ‘sensitive,
emphatic counselor,’” can undermine a litigant’s
understanding of the way a court should operate and a
judge should act.226 A family court judge should be
empathetic and respectful, requiring everyone in the
courthouse to treat litigants considerately. Civility and
respect have, as their end goals, a fair and timely process
even if the outcome does not satisfy everyone. As Judge
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Hardcastle points out, the promise that a court can solve
problems is essentially a lie.227
Most litigants in family court have complex family
issues and are in desperate need of basic human services
that might make a difference: employment, decent
education and health care, child care and mental health
treatment, good housing and safe neighborhoods. Family
court judges cannot provide for those complex needs even
if they wish they could. As Kahn pointed out in 1953, “In
reviewing the Court’s total performance it must be recalled
that its task is exceedingly difficult and that many people
come to it because of the failings or lacks in other agencies
in the community…The basic fact which remains, however,
is that many children and parents known to the Court
require a complex range of services and facilities, but only
a minority are well served.”228 Myleniec and Gerraghty
repeated this “basic fact” fifty years later when they warned
that a unified family court cannot solve family problems:
Unified family courts by
themselves cannot stem the
increase in caseloads. They
can have no effect on the life
chances of the litigants prior
to the time a case is filed. Nor
will families face fewer
complex
problems
just
because court process and
jurisdiction have been unified
and the court becomes more
efficient. Poor education,
dwindling housing stock,
mental illness, drug use,
crime,
and
crumbling
227
228

Id. at 91-94.
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neighborhoods are all beyond
the reach of the court. Nor
can a court force the
executive and legislative
branches of government to
create more and better
services.229
Abandoning the therapeutic impulse to solve family
problems and improve family well-being does not mean
divesting the court of its adjudicative and dispositional
responsibilities. It means rethinking them. Juvenile and
family court judges have very difficult jobs. They see
thousands of litigants each year. These litigants are usually
the least favored among us, the poorest and the most
fragile. They are disproportionately people of color.
The court cannot solve the problems that bring them
there. What the court can do is make the best and fairest
decision possible with the resources available. Instead of
all the words used by judges who want to have some other
job, the litigants have a right to expect an impartial
decision-maker, who will listen to the evidence and make a
reasoned decision. Processes like hearings and settlement
conferences, slow our thinking down and require us to be
more deliberative. This is not an easy thing to do. We
know from the newest mind sciences that we’re not the
rational beings we thought we were. We know that judges,
like the rest of us, are subject to cognitive biases, but
cognitive biases can be challenged by trial procedures
subject to accountability standards, open courts and
appellate review. They are difficult to challenge in a court
where, as Judge Cindy Lederman says, “I’m not sitting
back and watching the parties and making a ruling. I’m
making comments. I’m encouraging. I’m making judgment
229
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calls. I’m getting very involved with families. I’m making
clinical therapeutic decisions to some extent, with the
advice of experts.”230
My plea is that Judge Lederman, and those like her,
be cautious, learn the lessons of history, mark the words of
Judge Hardcastle that therapeutic justice is an arrogant task,
and return to the humbler but nobler job of being a judge.

230

Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-making in a Dependency Court:
Heuristics, Cognitive Biases and Accountability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV.,
913, 937 (2013).

83

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 84

84

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 85
ESSENTIALS TO JUSTICE: A RIGHT TO COUNSEL SYMPOSIUM
ESSENTIALS TO JUSTICE: A RIGHT TO
COUNSEL SYMPOSIUM
WELCOME AND INTRODUCTIONS*
By: Douglas A. Blaze and Penny White
DEAN BLAZE: Can everybody hear me? I use my
classroom voice. I'm Doug Blaze. I'm Dean of the
University of Tennessee College of Law and I am
incredibly pleased to welcome all of you here. This is an
amazing program that has been put together. We six should
not be surprised when you put Mark Stephens, Penny
White, Jerry Black, Joy Radice, Val Vojdik and I'm leaving
somebody out. I'm leaving tons of people out. Mike
Whalen claims this was not steered, but obviously, these
people did a great job steering us into this position here
today, so welcome to the U.T. College of Law. It is
particularly appropriate, I think, that we have a program
like this at this College of Law at this law school because
this law school is incredibly -- has always been committed
to producing the absolutely best lawyers that we can and to
being connected with practice as tightly as we can. As
many of you may know, we have the, and I can say it
without even thinking, oldest continually operating legal
clinic program in the country and at one time, our clinic
was in fact the public defender for this area and so we have
a long connection with these issues, with access to justice
and with issues of defense. In fact, I hope -- and we have
had a long partnership with the public defender's office.
Very pleased to see a number of you here today, in addition
to Mark. You teach for us; you mentor our students; and
*
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most importantly, you hire our students, so that is a critical
part of what we do. And I hope that you -- those of you that
had the good fortune to come in from White -- from
Cumberland Avenue saw what this law school is about
when you walked in and it said Equal Access Equal Justice
Under Law. And those of you that came in from the back
understood that the real underpinning of that is written
above our door coming in off White Avenue, which is to
have the assistance of counsel, and that's what we're all
here about today. So we are very, very pleased you're here.
I'm very pleased to welcome you to the law school. It's
going to be an incredible three days. I also am incredibly
impressed that our mayor has managed to give you great
weather while you're stuck inside all day. At any rate, we
have an incredible city. Madeline Rogero is a terrific
mayor and we're very pleased that she is here today to
welcome you as well.
MAYOR ROGERO: Good afternoon everyone. I
am so pleased to be here. I was really thankful that Mark,
our public defender, gave me a call and asked if I would
be here today. I'm pleased to be here one for a couple of
reasons. One is that this is a great law school. We have
great professors here. We have great assets such as the
legal clinic. And I have personally, over the years, seen
the work that they have done and they do serve the
community so it's an amazing school and amazing
resources and so we as a community are really very
privileged and lucky to have them here and the
commitment to the community. You know, sometimes
you get in a university setting and you can tend to get
within the ivy walls, right, you know, and be kind of
insulated. This school isn't like that. This college is
always reaching out to our community. So thank you,
Doug, for you and all of your faculty and the way you do
that, and your students who so willing give of their time to
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our organizations and our people.
Also, I wanted to say something about Mark
Stephens, our public defender. The whole, the Public
Defender's Office again goes beyond just representing
your clients in the courtroom. They try to help change
their lives. We have a community, a law -- a community
office, what do you call that, a community law office,
which is the social service piece of that, and I was just
talking to Roger Noe, who works in that office, and I just
sent something -- somebody to him the other day, a
young man who had had a lot of problems and had some
legal difficulties and yet, he's trying to get his life back
together and you know, the kids, they dig themselves
into a hole and get fines and this and that and can't get
their license and it gets worse and worse and then when
they're trying to get their life together, you know, get it
back and get committed, then it's so hard to dig out from
under that so the community law office helps them dig
out from underneath that and get their life back together.
That's an unbelievable commitment from the Public
Defender's Office and an unbelievable resource for our
people here in the city and so thank you, and I can brag
about a lot of you so I'm not going to take up all my time
doing that, but I am very pleased with the quality of legal
service we have and the commitment from our legal
community to really promoting access to justice for our
people.
I have looked at the agenda and it looks interesting.
I would really love to hear a lot of the stuff. I wish I could
stay. And when I looked at the panelists, I probably know
most all of the local panelists, and I know you're going to
be really pleased. This is a really top-notch group. They're
respected not only in the legal circles but respected
throughout our community so I know you will enjoy what
they have to say.
Now, I'm not a lawyer; I am a city planner and I
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have a background in community development and youth
development, but I know and appreciate that the right to
competent representation is a bedrock of our legal system
and our democracy. And one of our biggest responsibilities
as a society, as legal counsel, as mayor, is to make sure that
we protect those who are most vulnerable, so I really
applaud you for being here and for the work that you do. I
know that's a principle that you all really hold dear and it's
one that I do as well. And both of all of us on a daily basis
have to live that and make sure that happens.
Now, really my main duty as mayor is to talk to you
about what a great city you're in and hope – how many are
not from Knoxville? Okay. Well, I'm going to say some
things that even those who are from Knoxville may not
even know but I want you to know that -- I want to
encourage you to get out and enjoy Knoxville while you're
here. I know you're going to be at the Sunsphere I think
tonight so when you look out when you're up there high
and you look out, you will see three hundred and sixty
degrees what our city looks like, you know, from campus -I mean from the World's Fair Site, the home of the 1982
World's Fair to -- which is now a wonderful park for
community events. You will be able to see our downtown,
our surrounding areas and even off to the mountains. Also,
just a little ways from there is our downtown and I hope
you will have time either after the reception tonight and
maybe dinner tomorrow night to get out on Market Square.
That's a place where we have a lot of community events.
Tonight, actually is -- we have a band from 7:00 to 9:00
p.m. called Dixie Ghost, and I'm told that the acoustical
part sounds like Allison Krauss and Union Station, so if
you like that kind of music, and Blue Highway, you're
going to enjoy Dixie Ghost. And there's some other
surprises there happening tonight since it's close to
Halloween. Also, Gay Street, you need to walk Gay Street.
We have a great general store called Mast General Store.
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There's a great little music shop with banjos and mandolins
and guitars, and often there might even be a little pick-up, a
little gig that somebody decides to play while you're there.
The -- also, we have some wonderful performance theaters
on Gay Street. The Tennessee Theater, if you can sneak in
there and see what that looks like. It's an unbelievable
facility that we've spent millions of dollars on that the
community came together a few years ago and, you know,
and restored that, so a lot of great things downtown. Of
course, there's some clubs, there's some bars, there's
restaurants, many ways to spend your money. And if
you're young enough, Urban Outfitters. We have our own
Urban Outfitters downtown as well. Buy something for
your kids if you can't fit into that stuff. I know I can't.
Anyway. Also, Knoxville is an outdoor community. You
know, we're a river city, we're a mountain city and we have
really focused on the outdoors and when you get outside
and just kind of look beyond right downtown, you will see,
you can see the mountains in the distance. We used to have
to go to the Great Smoky Mountains, that's what we did, to
get outdoors and enjoy nature, but what we realized is that
we have a little jewel right here in South Knoxville right
across – right over the river, and that's -- and we have
branded that jewel the Urban Wilderness. We have a
thousand acres of property of ten city parks, a three
hundred acre nature city called Ijams, blueways,
greenways. We have four Civil War battle sites. We have
these thousand acres that are connected that we're working
to connect together and this is an outdoor recreation
destination. We've got forty-six -- just within a mile or two
of downtown, we have forty-six miles of hiking and biking
trails that the Appalachian Mountain Bike Club volunteers
built, forty-six miles. They built it with their blood, sweat
and tears, and cases and cases and kegs of beer went into
that, but they did it themselves so it's an unbelievable
resource right in our city. And we've got two quarries, one
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where you can paddle in or kayak and people rappel off
into the water so it's a pretty amazing asset. We also have a
great group called Legacy Park Foundation that really
started this and they have a center where their headquarters
are right -- headquarters is, right near the river near the
Ruth's Chris Restaurant. And they have an outdoor
Knoxville Adventure center there so if you have a little bit
of time and you want to paddle board or you want to
bicycle, you can go there and rent bikes or canoes or paddle
boards and get out in and enjoy our greenways or our
Tennessee River. So there's lots of things to do while
you're here. So we encourage you to spend your money, to
enjoy your time while you're here and if -- hopefully there
will be some time for them to do that. Are you finished on
Saturday? Eleven-thirty. Oh, Farmer's Market on Saturday
on Market Square, so you really want to see some of this.
And for those of you who do live in Knoxville, if you
haven't taken advantage of all that, then you need to get out
there too and see it.
Anyway, hope you have a wonderful three days
here. It's an important topic. I know you will dig into it but
also have some fun while you're here and enjoy Knoxville.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR WHITE: So you see how fortunate
we are not only to have a wonderful mayor but to have a
wonderful dean and wonderful law school. I'm Penny
White and I'm the director for the Clinic for Advocacy and
Dispute Resolution and had another wonderful opportunity
to work on this conference but only in the background. So I
want to tell you the people who made this conference
possible very quickly before I turn it over to Reverend Fels.
So if you're here and you were part of this non-steering
steering committee as Professor Whalen called it, please
stand and accept the appreciation of the crowd so the
community was comprised of Mark Stephens; Reverend
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Charlie Fels; Mike Whalen; Ursula Bailey; Beth Ford;
Randy Reagan; Jonathan Cooper; Jerry Black; Tom
Dillard; myself and folks, you just cannot believe the work
that Joy Radice has put into this conference. Whalen can
tell you all day long that there was no steering but she's
been steering for over a year on this endeavor so I hope you
will have a chance to tell her personally how much you
appreciate it.
Another thing we're grateful for are great lawyers
who did great things as lawyers but now are doing great
things wearing other hats so with no more time being taken,
I would like to present Reverend Charles Fels.
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ESSENTIALS TO JUSTICE: A RIGHT TO COUNSEL SYMPOSIUM
INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS: WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS*
By: Ndume Olatushani and Anne-Marie Moyes
Introduction: Reverend Charles Fels
REVEREND FELS: In the year 1765, William
Blackstone began to publish his magisterial commentary on
the laws of England. When he came to the criminal justice
process in England in the eighteenth century, he wrote, "It
is far better to acquit ten guilty men than it is to convict a
single innocent person for a crime he did not commit."
Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson raised the ante.
They said, "It is far better to acquit a hundred guilty people
than to convict a single innocent person." And they were
put in the shade by the great Jewish Rabbi, Maimonides,
who said, "It is far better to let a thousand guilty go free
than to convict a single innocent person." Throughout the
generations, we, as a moral people, know that it is
repugnant to our souls to convict the innocent and yet we
know we do it. My name is Charles Fels. I am a
recovering lawyer and a priest in the Episcopal Church. I
have served as a federal prosecutor, a state prosecutor and a
criminal defense attorney and I know from personal
experience the importance of quality legal representation
for both sides in a criminal case.
And it has been my somber privilege to meet, to
know and to introduce not one, not two, but three men who
were falsely convicted and sentenced to die and were
finally released.
This afternoon, you and I are deeply privileged to
be with Ndume and his wife, Ann Marie, as they tell us
*
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their story of what it is to live Blackstone's nightmare.
Ndume was convicted of a murder in Memphis, a town he
had never visited, represented by, no doubt, well-intended
lawyers, who in Shelby County, Tennessee, with a fifty
percent black and white population, managed to succeed in
picking an entirely one hundred percent white jury. At the
end of the first part of the proceedings, when Ndume, to his
astonishment, was found guilty, these lawyers began to
work on their preparations for the death penalty phase of
the case. They gave it their best shot in three hours and
failed to call a number of witnesses who had important
testimony to give as they had failed to call important
witnesses in the first half of the case. This is no surprise.
Blackstone's nightmare becomes reality when lawyers are
not qualified to do the job they have been hired to do.
Sentenced to death, Ndume spent twenty-seven years in
prison, nineteen years on death row in a cell that is six feet
by ten feet and when you go home tonight, you might pace
that out in your smallest bedroom and see what it feels like.
He was blessed with a great internal strength that led him to
art, and if you have the chance to see his paintings, you will
see this explosion of righteous colors depicting an Africa
he has never yet visited except in his spirit and in his soul.
He experienced a miracle.
Ann Marie, graduate of Johns Hopkins, went to
Germany for a year and when she returned, she was
appalled by the disparity between black and white, rich and
poor in America and she became dedicated to work on
death row in California and came to know Ndume as an
artist and then as a human being. And she studied her case,
his case. And she invited Gottlieb Cleary, some of you
know that famous New York firm, to represent Ndume pro
bono and she herself decided to acquire a legal education.
And went to Vanderbilt, which gives me great pleasure
because I went to Vanderbilt and my wife Susan went to
Vanderbilt. And unlike me, Ann Marie was first in her
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class at the end of three years and became a public
defender, what a noble call for a highly credentialed
lawyer, and she did it to help Ndume, and she was the one
that found the missing piece that had led to his wrongful
conviction and she was the one that helped sustain him
through the arduous process of Tennessee's direct appeal,
post-conviction appeal and that well known writ of error,
Coram Nobis.
Today is a gift for you and for me, but I hope it will
frame the next two and a half days because for the next two
and a half days, we are studying what we need to do to
fulfill the mandate of the life and the witness of Clarence
Gideon. And if it stands for anything at all, it stands for
this: whether it's ten or a hundred or a thousand who are
released, it is a moral imperative in America to never
convict an innocent man.
It's a privilege to be able to introduce Ndume and
Ann Marie, husband and wife, and have them share with us
today what it is to live the nightmare and what it is finally
to live the dream. Welcome.
MS. MOYES: Thank you so much for having us
here today. Ndume and I feel very lucky to share our story
often with different groups of people. I think it's so
important that we tell and retell these stories of wrongful
conviction because they really help us to think about what
goes wrong in our criminal justice system and hopefully,
prompts us all to work harder for the reforms that need to
happen. I'm going to speak for a little while to tell you the
story about Ndume's case, but I'm going to try to not keep it
too long because I know you want to hear from Ndume.
But I think his comments will be more meaningful if you
hear the details of exactly what happened that led to his
wrongful conviction.
So let me tell you first a little bit about the crime. Ndume
was convicted of a felony murder. That just means it was a
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murder that took place in the course of a felony. So what
happened is several individuals went into a grocery store in
Memphis early on a Sunday morning, Sunday October 2nd.
One of the perpetrators went up to the storeowner, who
happened to be working at the cash register. What they
didn't know is that he was armed and so when they realized
he was armed, there was a moment of panic, several shots
were fired in the store and one of them killed the
storeowner. Witnesses in the store -- there were about ten
people in the store -- described the perpetrators as two
black men and one black woman. And soon the police got
a big lead. They found the getaway car that had been used
in the perpetrators abandoned near the store and they
figured out that that car had been stolen from the Hertz
Rental Car Agency at the St. Louis Airport. So
immediately, the Memphis police started looking at
suspects from the St. Louis area. Ndume is from St. Louis.
He was born and raised there. He had a minor criminal
record. There was nothing in his background that made
him stand out from the thousands of other black men in St.
Louis, but for some reason that has never been explained to
us, they ended up zeroing in on him as a possible suspect.
So what case did the prosecution come up with to
convict him? This was their case. Of the ten witnesses in
the store, they were unable to find anybody who could
make a positive identification of Ndume, but they brought
in one witness, Tommy Perkins, who said that Ndume
looked like the person he had seen for just a few seconds as
he was leaving the store and the perpetrators were coming
in. He admitted on the stand that he was not more than
eighty percent sure of his identification. Two individuals,
Elizabeth Starks and Dennis Williams, were boyfriend and
girlfriend at that time, and they said that Ndume and
several friends of his had stayed at their house that
weekend. They identified the get-away car and said they
had seen Ndume and his companions in the get-away car.
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They said that these individuals were talking about robbing
a store but they had no firsthand knowledge of what had
actually transpired in the store. Beverly Batts was an
acquaintance of Ndume. She had a criminal record herself
but she testified that Ndume confessed to her that he
committed a murder in Memphis. She knew no details of
it. She just said he had made the statement to her. And
finally, the police said that they found a palm print of
Ndume's on the exterior of the get-away car on the roof of
the car. So, that was the State's case.
Ndume had an alibi defense. Miraculously for him,
he thought, when he was first suspected of the crime, is that
he remembered exactly where he was that weekend. His
mother's birthday is October 1st. He has a large family.
He's one of eleven children. And that weekend they threw a
big party for his mother's birthday. So that was that
Saturday night that the party took place. So even him being
at the party Saturday night was a strong alibi because the
State's case had him in Memphis that entire weekend. Even
if he was in St. Louis on Saturday night, that in itself was
very exculpatory. There were about thirty alibi witnesses
who all insisted that he was in St. Louis at this party and
other people who saw him even throughout the day on
Sunday. There was a gardener who had done some work
on a property Ndume owned. He said he went by Ndume's
house Sunday morning, right around the time the crime was
committed. He went by Ndume's St. Louis house and
Ndume was there and paid him some money that he owed
him.
Despite that albi, the all-white jury convicted
Ndume. As Reverend Fels mentioned, the prosecution was
able to empanel an all-white jury. This was before Batson.
Batson was pending before the Supreme Court at the time
of Ndume's trial, so the prosecution actually used each one
of their preemptory strikes to eliminate African Americans
from the jury pool. No preemptories were used against

96

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 97
white, potential white jurors.
And also as Reverend Fels mentioned, Ndume's
trial counsel admitted in post-conviction that he did zero
preparation for the penalty phase of the trial until the guilt
phase was over. So then he had about three hours to do that
preparation. The only thing that he did was he talked to
Ndume's mother and mildly prepped her to testify. She
basically got on the stand and pleaded for Ndume's life.
The trial lawyer waived opening statement. And as I said,
he called just one witness, Ndume's mother, and he made a
very meager closing argument in which he said something
to the effect of “it's not my role to tell you whether Ndume
is a good enough man to live. That is your decision.” So he
was not the most effective advocate. The jury obviously
unanimously voted to impose the death penalty.
So at this point, the appeals process began.
Ndume’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct
appeal but prior to post-conviction review, a huge miracle
happened. Ndume had been appointed a post-conviction
lawyer who was a solo practitioner in Memphis who really
didn't want to do a lot of work on the case and when he
realized that I was starting to agitate for some real
representation to happen and some real investigation to
happen, he did some pretty unethical things to try to get off
the case. But it ended up being a great opportunity for us
because we knew the court was going to appoint new
counsel; we wanted to just make sure it was the right
counsel this time. So I started a phone campaign where I
just called anybody I knew with any sort of reasonable
reputation in the post-conviction field and when they said
no, I can't take it, I would say well, who[m] do you think I
should talk to. And that just went on for a few months.
At one point, I talked to somebody at the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund in New York and there was an effort at the
time in New York to recruit big New York law firms to
take death penalty cases in the south. And so they agreed to
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pitch Ndume's case as one of the cases they were pitching
to New York firms. And miraculously, Cleary Gottlieb
Steen and Hamilton, a firm of, I'm not sure how many
lawyers worldwide, I think they have five hundred lawyers
in their New York office, but they agreed to take the case
pro bono. So that was huge. And one of the pleasures of
going through the appeals process with Ndume, I mean it
was always frustrating because until the very end, despite
how strong I felt like our claims were, you know, it was -it felt hard to get a fair hearing before the courts, but it was
always very satisfying to walk into the court with the
Cleary team. There would be, you know, one or two
prosecutors on one side and there would be the five lawyers
and the two paralegals and, you know, the whole, you
know, with their boxes and stuff and so that was always
satisfying.
So in post-conviction, we received the police file
for the first time, and I'm sure as many of you are aware,
you know, you rely on the prosecutor to give you Brady
material at the time of trial, but in most jurisdictions when
you start post-conviction, they will turn over that file.
That's not universally true, but in Tennessee and most
jurisdictions, including Memphis, they will turn over that
file. So this was the big explosive moment in the appeals
process that we found a lot Brady material in the file. We
found a lot of evidence that all pointed to an alternate group
of suspects that had no connection at all to Ndume. The
withheld evidence all pertained to this group of people. We
actually started calling them the Brown Gang just because
that's sort of a short name and then the courts ended up, you
know, taking on that moniker. And so that's what they have
been referred to. But it was comprised of Michael Brown,
his brother Eric Brown, their cousin by marriage, Charles
Keller, and two women. Only one of [the women] is
pictured here, Betty Jo Ford, and Darvi Cunningham. And
this is a group of people that committed a lot of criminal
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activity together. They stole cars. They engaged in
prostitution, a host of different things.
And this is the evidence that was withheld. There were
two eyewitnesses that identified members of the Brown
Gang. There was an eyewitness in the store who saw the
shooting at close range who identified Michael Brown as
the shooter. There was a witness outside the store. He was
a young man, a teenager, and he actually had seen the
perpetrators changing the license plates and thought,
“something fishy is going on here.” And he went back and
told his mother what he had seen, and she said well, you
need to walk back there and you need to pay real close
attention so that if you ever need to report something to the
police, you can. So he walked by again and really gave it
his attention. When the police said they were going to show
him a photo array, he said he was confident he would be
able to pick out the two individuals he saw changing the
license plate. And, when he was shown an array of twentyfour pictures that included Ndume's picture, he
immediately picked out Michael Brown and his cousin
Charles Keller as the two men who were changing the
license plate. The police then began investigating the
Brown Gang. What they found out is consistent with the
getaway car that had been stolen from the Hertz Rental Car
Agency at the St. Louis Airport. The Brown Gang had a
history of stealing rental cars from the Hertz Agency. And
they were -- when the Memphis police contacted the St.
Louis Airport police and said who are your suspects in this
string of car thefts that you had, they got a fax back that
said Michael Brown, Eric Brown, Charles Keller and a
couple other names at the bottom.
Then not only that, but the police, they were able to
figure out that one of the other rental cars that the Brown
Gang had stolen had been recovered by the Memphis police
in Memphis. So they went to the address where this
previous rental car had been recovered and they decided to
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canvas the neighborhood. And they found a neighbor who
said well, not only did I see them in this previous car that
the police recovered, but he actually said I saw them in the
getaway car. And the getaway car was distinctive because
it had a piece of chrome missing from the front fender. And
before the police showed him a picture of the car or
brought him out to the impound lot to look at the getaway
car, he mentioned that specific feature of the car. So he
positively identified the car and said he had seen the
members of the Brown Gang in the car just weeks before
the crime happened.
There were items in the car that also further implicated
the Brown Gang. They had a reputation for traveling up
the highway between Memphis and Chicago and stopping
at truck stops along the way and engaging in prostitution.
And in the car, there were receipts from exactly that route
showing that they had stopped at some truck stops along
the way. So that was also consistent with their pattern of
criminal activity.
So when we found all of this stuff, I thought wow,
this is it. I mean how can a court look at all of this and say
this isn't a winning Brady claim.
Oh, sorry, I missed one thing. In addition to the
Brown Gang, there were a couple other things we found in
the police file that undermines some of the other evidence.
The palm print was always a big problem for us because it's
physical evidence and how do you explain that. But in the
police file, there was actually an initial report that they had
done when they were first looking into Ndume as a suspect.
And their initial print report said that his prints came back
negative but then in the margin of what looks like different
handwriting, there's a notation saying “no palm prints
submitted.” So their explanation was that early on in their
investigation -- when they initially compared the prints -they didn't have a palm print of his and so that's why the
prints initially came back negative. So one thing we found
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out in our own investigation is that, and this is kind of
complicated, but at the time they did their initial
comparison, they had obtained a print file from an agency
in St. Louis that definitely had a palm print. So that agency
told us anybody that requested his print file would have
gotten the entire range of prints and it made no sense that
they wouldn't have gotten the palm print. So there's every
reason to believe when their print report initially came back
negative that they did indeed have a palm print at that time.
But maybe more importantly, in the police file, there was a
report where the police had done an inventory when they
took the prints from the car., And according to their own
inventory, they didn't take a print from the area of the car
where they claim they matched Ndume's palm print. So we
felt like this was pretty circumstantial evidence that there
was something fishy going on, that there was some
fabrication.
I know you all know the Brady standards. You have
to show that the evidence was withheld, that it was
exculpatory. And then, you know, the thing that always
makes it difficult is showing that it was material, in dealing
with the subjectivity of the courts and what can be their sort
of results-oriented jurisprudence. So when we went
through post-conviction, the state courts denied the Brady
claim. And basically what they said is there was no
reasonable probability of a different outcome because the
remaining evidence of guilt was still too strong. That was
disappointing, but fortunately, the court did give sentencing
relief. And at the time, that was pretty devastating for me.
You know, I think in -- I don't know if any of you practice
in, you know, the capital, the capital world, but I think we
often, in that setting, look at, you know, overturning the
sentence as the big victory and all the lawyers around us
were just, you know, just celebrating like this was the big
thing, we got him off of death row. And at the time, I felt
just really disappointed because I felt like so much more
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needed to happen. But in retrospect, I think it happened the
way it just had to in the sense that you know, death penalty
cases are so politically charged., And I think that it's hard,
you know, especially on the state level, for courts to
overturn not just a sentence but a conviction. And once the
death penalty was off the table and we started litigating his
case as a regular case and not a capital case, I think it left
more room, more maneuverability for a court to do the
right thing. So the death sentence was overturned, not
because of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court said
that Ndume's lawyer was perfectly effective in his three
hour preparation for the penalty phase. But the state had
withheld evidence pertaining to one of the aggravators and
so based on that, the death sentence was overturned. The
state postured for little while like they were going to reseek death. We had a few dates for a resentencing hearing
but ultimately, when it really came down close to our final
hearing date, they ended up conceding to a life sentence
without demanding any concessions for Ndume. So he was
allowed to continue the appeal process. So after nineteen,
twenty years on death row, he was resentenced to life
imprisonment.
So this was the point where I decided that I needed
to investigate the case. There had been tremendous
resources brought to bear on this case and Cleary Gottlieb
did an amazing job. But they didn't have the ability to write
a check for hundreds of thousands of dollars, which is what
it would have cost to do the investigation that I did. So over
a period of about three years, after I graduated from law
school, I investigated Ndume's case mostly on the
weekends, and I traveled all around the country tracking
witnesses down.
I talked to Tommy Perkins. Basically, he said that
when the police did the identification process with him,
instead of showing him an array of pictures, they showed
him only photos of Ndume.And so they did a very -- a
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highly suggestive identification process which is very
improper. And then right before he went into court, they
actually cautioned him and said, you know, he might have
changed his appearance in some ways and don't let him
fool you by that. You know, you need to just go in there
and make an identification even if he looks different.
Beverly Batts, we uncovered some information that
she had previously made a false accusation against
Ndume's niece for a crime that she herself committed. You
know, there's a string of things we found out about her.
She had a history of committing perjury. The prosecutor in
Ndume's case had actually promised to expunge her record
if she testified against him. She had a history of mental
illness of dissociative personality disorder. So we felt like
that was pretty significant in impeaching her reliability.
But I think what it all boiled down to in the
investigation is, you know, that Dennis Williams and
Elizabeth Starks were saying that Ndume was at their house
that weekend and, you know, that he was in the get-away
car and somehow we had to undermine their testimony. I
went to talk to Dennis Williams and he very immediately
recanted. He said that he had identified Ndume in advance
of trial under a lot of police pressure that he was very
scared that he was going to be charged himself. Both he
and Elizabeth had been given immunity in exchange for
their testimony, so they both were definitely scared that
they had been in the get-away car themselves that weekend,
they had been around the perpetrators. But that was helpful
that he recanted his testimony.
We made multiple attempts to speak to Elizabeth
Starks but she would never speak to us. She was very
hostile. But I started thinking, and this is what got me
thinking, as I looking at the police reports one day and I
noticed that -- I knew that, East Dison was Elizabeth's
mother's house because I had been by there looking for her.
And the police reports, you can see a little clip there that
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shows, you know, “we went to 575 East Dison and located
Elizabeth Starks.” But one day I was looking at the police
reports and I noticed on page 224 that when the police were
describing Betty Jo Ford as a member of the Brown Gang,
her background, they mentioned Dison as a former address
of hers. And all of a sudden, this light bulb went off in my
head and I'm like oh, my God, they're connected. Like that
would explain everything. So I went and talked to a couple
of people and I ended up determining that yes, there was a
strong connection between them. They had been friends
since childhood. They held themselves out as cousins to
people. People said when you saw one, you always saw the
other. They were inseparable.
These are three witnesses we put on in a Coram Nobis
hearing that confirmed the strong connection between
Elizabeth Starks and Betty Jo Ford. So basically, you
know, we were able to show through that connection not
only that Elizabeth Starks had a huge motive to lie and
point attention away from the perpetrators, her friends, the
Brown Gang, and toward someone else, but it also just
further implicates the Brown Gang. because somebody was
at her house that weekend. According to tips the police had
gotten, the perpetrators were at her house, and she has the
connection to the Brown Gang. It just further reinforces
that the Brown Gang were indeed the real perpetrators.
So fortunately in Tennessee, there was a mechanism
to bring this new evidence before the state courts through a
Coram Nobis petition. And on December 9th, 2011, we
had our big moment and the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals vacated Ndume's conviction. They said Elizabeth
Starks had been significantly impeached and discredited.
They said the sole witness, -- eyewitness, to make an
identification had likewise been significantly impeached
and multiple pieces of evidence implicated the Brown
Gang. Then several months later on June 1, 2012, Ndume
was released. He actually did end up taking an Alford Plea.
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That was a difficult decision, but he was down in the
Shelby County Jail. After his conviction was overturned,
he was moved down there and he was there for about a
month. And Memphis is a difficult place. It's very different
from where I practice in Nashville. You know, as soon as
his conviction was overturned and we were anticipating
going back to Memphis, I thought well, certainly, they will
let him out on bond, you know, he can get a bond.He
served so much time, and in a weird twist of events, he had
gone up for parole and been granted parole right before his
conviction, the overturning of his conviction became final,
and sort of made that parole decision moot and ineffective.
So he had just gotten parole, , but it didn't become effective
and then he was whisked out of there back to the county jail
and I thought, how could a court not give him a bond., But
we're talking with people in Memphis and they say “oh,
well, there's a good chance they'll re-seek the death penalty
just as a way to make sure that he can't get out on bond.,”
And it was just such a different world down there and we
were, you know, counseled by people that I trust that there
was a good chance he would spend two to three more years
down in the Memphis County Jail trying to call their bluff
and have them finally admit there was no case left to be
tried. So, Ndume decided that the Alford Plea was the best
thing for him to do.
So now what I'm going to do is show you a video,
the moments Ndume walked out of the Memphis County
Jail, and then after that, I will turn it over to him.
(Video Playing)
MR. OLATUSHANI: Good afternoon, everybody.
Every time I see that video, I can't tell you guys what type
of emotions there that actually raised for me. You know,
we often hear this, you know, people say a picture is worth
a thousand words, but I'm telling you even when you look
at that video, it belies everything that I really -- I mean
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everything that was really going on inside of [me]
emotionally and also what is still happening to me right
now. Today, I've been home now a little over, almost two
and a half years, and I still wake up every day as happy as I
was -- as happy as I was when I walked out of that
Memphis County Jail. When you look at that -- when you
look at that, you know, kind of look at that picture, one of
the things that happened when they was -- you heard them
talking about, we was talking about the letter. I was
actually supposed to get out two days before I actually
walked out of there, so they was able to squeeze two more
days out of me and so, but like I said, every time I see it, it,
you know, it's just another reminder, you know, of how
grateful I really am.
I will start out by telling you guys that even though
I spent right at twenty-eight years in prison, and certainly a
whole lot was taken from me the time that I was sitting
there, but I'm telling you I stand before you guys a
fortunate man. I really am. It's truly a miracle that I'm
actually here. Obviously, you guys know the system and
you know how serious that it really is to be sitting on death
row and for me to actually be here, you know, with a lot of
work just like Anne-Mariesaid, on her part and other
people, it really is a miracle. The one thing Anne-Marie
didn't say about -- what she was saying about the law firm
and how they decided to take my case was the story goes
that the lawyers at Cleary that decided that they was going
to, you know, opt in and try to help, you know, with cases
coming out of the south or whatever, and they said that they
was two cases came before mine and they was like this, no,
this case is too bad and all, send us another one; and they
got the second case, and after that, they said they decided,
listen, we agreed that we was going to do a case so the next
case come across our desks, we're just going to have to take
it and so lucky, -- lucky for me, it was my case.
As you see, it was up there, they did over seventeen

106

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 107
thousand hours on my case over a period a little over
seventeen years that they worked on my case and, you
know, like I said, it was a miracle, you know, that my case
came when it actually did. I think the one thing, and I'm
sure a lot of you guys, you know, practicing attorneys, you
did, you know, probably had the occasion to go inside the
jail or a prison and visit a client or whatever case it is, and a
lot of these places that you go to, you go to these prisons, I
mean you got these manicured lawns, you know, flowers.
If you go there, you can go there in the wintertime, you’re
liable to see some flowers. This is how, you know, pretty
they make it and, you know. But I think the thing that you
don't know is when you're sitting, like Reverend Fels said,
in a six by ten foot cell twenty-three hours of the day, only
-- every time I came out of my cell, I'm being shackled and
chained like some imaginary monster to be moved from
right here no further than this point up here to be put in the
shower and take another ten to fifteen minutes to unchain
me and shackle me just to give me a ten minute shower
more or less depending on which officer was actually
taking me out to give me the shower that, you know, that in
the unit too, I don't know if any of you guys have been
there, I know you have, that, you know, you in this unit and
you can't walk more than fifty feet and not be turning in a
circle. That's how small this unit is.
And the only time -- the only time that a person
comes out of there is you either going to court or God
forbid, you got to be going to the prison infirmary or
outside hospital for something that may have went wrong.
But other than that, these are the only times that you would
actually come out of that unit. And what they had is this
outside, supposedly outside, rec yard that we would get an
hour outside a day to come out, is really was just probably
about a fifteen by, maybe fifteen, foot cage, a concrete wire
cage, that we would actually be brought out, you know, to
just come out in the yard so for like twenty years, I'm

107

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 108
standing in this cage, I'm looking outside, I can see there's
grass, but I don't even get a chance, for twenty years, I don't
even get access to, you know, to touch grass, let alone walk
on it. And I say this, you know, to, like again, to say in my
own situation it's truly a miracle that I stand before you
guys hopefully, you know, a whole person given everything
that I had to, you know, just kind of deal with.
You know, one of the things that I think that when
this thing happened to me, I was completely angry about
what happened and I can’t -- I ain't going to even tell you
what I wanted to tell them people when we was in court
when they actually did what they did, but you probably can
imagine what I wanted to say.But for the first couple of
years, I was really angry about, you know, what had
happened to me and—but unfortunately, what happened,
the worst thing, the worst possible thing that could have
happened to me, was the thing that actually knocked me
down where I was able to pick myself back up and begin to
just put my best foot forward and, you know, get -- get on
that road to getting to where I am right now.
And that is that the worst possible thing that can
happen to a person sitting in prison is that the people come
and tell you, you need to make a phone call home because
you know if they come and tell you this, something really
bad has happened at home and so you never want to get this
phone call -- people coming and telling you about this
phone call. And so for me, they came, I'm in my cell, they
came and the guy came and told me that I needed to come
downstairs because I needed to make a phone call home
and so, you know, when I'm, you know, getting geared up
for this thing, I'm thinking, you know, I'm thinking all these
worst possible scenarios about what's going to happen
when I get out of here on this phone but the one thing that
didn't come to my mind was that when I get down there
that my mother wasn't going to be on the other end. And so
when I get down there, it was my sister on the other end
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telling me about my mother had been killed in a car
accident and like I said, even before that happened, I was in
a place that I was, angry as hell, you know, and pretty
much, you know, at the bottom as far as I was concerned,
but that knocked me. I’m talking about that laid me out.
I'm talking about I couldn't be hurt no more at that point.
I'm flat on the ground and so it was that thing that
happened like I said that began to allow for me to pick
myself up and begin to try to put the pieces back together,
because one of the things – the thing that -- one of the
things that -- the last thing that I said to my mother before
this happened, she was leaving out of the visiting room and
I just jokingly said to her “oh, girl, I wouldn't know what to
do if I didn't have you in my life,” And that was really true
I'm talking about because she was with me when I felt like
the world was against me. And she just kind of jokingly
said, “Oh, you're going to know exactly what to do when
the time comes,” and I can't imagine that either one of us
knew that that was going to be the last time we see each
other but it was. And so -- and, you know, when I get this, - when I get this news, I'm telling you for the first three
days, if my eyes was open, I was crying. If I wasn't crying,
I was sleeping. I wasn’t -- them was the only things I was
doing because I was trying to pick myself back up.
But the thing that happened, I was laying down in
bed and I'm telling you as clear as we sit here, my mother
just came to me and said ”Get up,” and when she said it, I
jumped straight up, because I'm telling you this is how it
really was, and I'm thinking man, this nightmare is actually
over, but obviously I woke up to the same thing so -- but
like I said, it was the thing that she said to me that kept
ringing in my ears about that I'm “going to know exactly
what to do.” And so it was then, and it certainly didn't
happen overnight, but it was then, like I said, that I began
to try to move forward and maintain everything that this
system was trying to take from me or trying to, you know,
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rob me of in terms of my humanity, dignity and everything,
because this is what this whole process is. I'm sure you
guys know that in order for somebody to be at a place
where you trying to, I mean just methodically or
consciously think about taking somebody's life, you got to
first dehumanize them. You got to make them something
less than human. And that's what this whole -- the whole
death penalty process is I'm talking about. I sit on -- I
mean from where I sit, I seen people commit suicide, I seen
people come in that wasn't on medication and that still on
medication because of this whole process. And so that's
what I began to do is like I said, is just to try to pull myself
back together.
And one of the things that happened, and you guys
will walk out of here, you will see some of my artwork out
there, one of the things that happened, it was a guy on death
row with me, he was an artist, and I actually commissioned
him to do a portrait of me because I wanted to send it to my
mother. And she didn't get a chance to see it and she
probably wouldn't have recognized me anyway from his
interpretation. But what happened, he did this portrait, but
by the time I got it, you know, my mother had passed away.
[Jason – Ndume is pointing to photo on projector screen of
his mother, but it seems unclear in text what he’s saying. I
think this edit makes it at least understandable.] But one of
things that once he did this portrait, when I said it looked
nothing like me, it looked nothing like me, but I had to pay
him and so I still had to pay him. And so I’m in this little
cell, in this little space, and every time I looked at it, I'm,
you know, kind of beating myself up about, you know,
almost feeling like a sucker, I had to pay, you know, this
money for this portrait. But the thing that I kept telling
myself was that, you know, where I'm sitting at, man, I
could have actually did a better job myself and kept my
money. And so one of the -- and I didn't immediately start,
you know, drawing then, but as I -- like I said, I was trying
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to go through this fire that I did start drawing and once I
started drawing, I just, you know, stuck with it and, you
know, and started painting and hopefully, you know,
became a pretty good artist, but I know I still got some
work to do, but art in a lot of ways saved my life though. It
really did. Like he said, you can see a lot of my work. It's
a lot of color in my work.
And because I was sitting in this environment, I
mean if it were -- was some paint on the wall, most of the
paint looked like the color of this ceiling if it was painted,
you know, in places where it should have been., I began to
try to, you know, just bring this color and imagination into
my life that allowed for me to, like I said, you know, begin
to just try to get through this fire that I had found myself in.
And, you know, and I think that one of the things -- one of
the things that I learned through that process is that, and
maybe this is just me and how I kind of, you know, kind of
coped with what I had to deal with, I think that -- well, I
know that life going to certainly knock us down, ain't no
question about that., Everybody ain't going to get knocked
down like I did, but we are going to always run into these
where we kind of get knocked down in life and the thing
about, I think what's important is not that we got knocked
down but how we picked ourselves back-up. Because I
think, you know, that if somebody came and knocked one
of you guys out of your chair right now, I mean that's kind
of on them, but if a person come back and you lying there
for more, talking about woe you, well then, that's kind of
on you at that point. And so I just think that, you know,
whatever, you know, whatever we go through and the thing
that I went through in life, you know, I mean I survived it
because like I said, I seen a lot of, you know, a lot of
people that still on death row, good friends of mine, that
certainly, you know, weren't able to handle it or are still not
handling it in the way that I actually was.
I had a lot of good people in my life, family and
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people that helped shore me up when I was weakening and
you know, just kind of beaten down by the system. But I
think that, you know, like I said, that whatever you guys do
– let me say this here too real quick before I say that, and
that is that one of the things that really, you know, that
really made a difference to me while I was sitting there
when those lawyers came on my case and they seen me as a
human being as opposed to just somebody just on paper
that they was coming there trying, you know, work to save
my life, like she said, just to get me off death row, and, you
know, and just kind of have, you know, say that they did
what they, you know, came to do. I mean these were
people that I'm certainly good friends with right now. I talk
to some of them regularly. That really made a difference in
my life when I had, you know, lawyers, you know, seeing
me as who I was and not, you know, like I said, this case on
paper, you know. And they dealt with me like that because
the one thing that Anne-Marie didn't say when she said the
lawyer, prior to them coming on, that were doing these
unethical things just to trying to get off my case, he
actually, Stephen Leffler, I don't know what he doing in
Memphis now if he still down there, but he actually filed a
motion in court telling the court that they needed to reevaluate my indigent status because Anne-Marie and some
other people had raised five thousand dollars and had paid
investigators to do some stuff on my case. And so when he
found this out, he actually went and finagled copies of the
checks from them and went and filed a motion with the
court telling the court that they needed to re-evaluate my
indigent status. And like she said, it was the best that
happened that he actually did that, but I mean that's the
type of lawyer that I was dealing with.
And so like I said, when I had, you know, David
and other people from Cleary come in and treat me like a
human being, then it really made a difference. And I say
that, you know, simply to say you guys, as public
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defenders, I know that you, you know, you probably got a
lot of work on your desk but it really made a difference
when people sit down with me and treated me like a human
being and I would encourage you guys to do the same thing
whoever you're working with, you know, just try to treat
them like human beings.
But the thing that I was fixing to say too is that,
about like I say, just going through this fire, that the thing
that helps me keep getting up doing the work that I do and
hopefully trying to make a difference in people not ending
up not only in the situation that I did but also too just this
whole, you know, criminal justice system generally that -- I
think that the thing that, you know, I believe is, you know,
whatever fires that we go through that if we get through to
the other side, it ain't meant for us. It was meant for other
people. I mean like I said, I survived it and certainly, I
didn't do it by myself, but, you know, like I said, it's
certainly given me the ability and just the will to come out
here and do some of the work that I'm doing and I mean the
work that I'm doing, I'm so fortunate. Like I said, the work
that I'm doing, I work for the Children Defense Fund and
my whole sole focus is on this issue of this cradle to prison
pipeline issue. And I get a chance to work with a lot of
young kids in high schools, you know, wherever, you
know, I'm allowed to go speaking with them and just trying
to educate them about this system because a lot of them
look like the very people that I was seeing as I sit nearly
three decades seeing younger and younger people coming
in with more and more time and, you know.
I think that, like I said, some of the work that I was
doing in prison, because I was one of the people that I
chose not to have a TV in my cell for the first ten years that
I was in prison because I didn't want to get lost in the space
of this just little small space into this TV. Like I said, once
I began to pick myself back up, I wanted to make sure that I
was doing everything that I possibly could to make sure
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that the people that was trying to murder me, that they -- it
certainly wasn't going to happen because I laid down in the
fight. And so like I said, I chose not to have a TV, but as I
went through, you know, I was one of the people that chose
to read. I'm sure I, you know, read, you know, probably a
few thousand books the time I was sitting in prison. I took
some college courses, became a certified paralegal. I did
everything that I possibly could to prepare myself to come
out and, you know, be a productive person as much as I
possibly could. And like I said, but it certainly didn't
happen -- I couldn't have did it by myself. I really couldn't
have.
And like I said, I think it's important that whatever
work that you do and whoever you're working for makes a
difference when you treat them like human beings and it
really do. And I don't know how much time we got.
PROFESSOR RADICE: I think we wanted to field
some questions so we probably have maybe seven minutes
for two to three questions. I would love to hear from
students too.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: It's actually a question for
both of you. You are a paralegal and a lawyer working in
capital habeas work. Did you do anything about the
prosecutors that hid the evidence, and is there any recourse
on prosecutorial misconduct?
MR. OLATUSHANI: Well, I mean I'm sure you
guys know that prosecutors operate with impunity. I mean
these are the most powerful people in the system in terms
of just they position and when you got a system that's, you
know, failed to hold them accountable, unless you got a
prosecutor coming in there saying yeah, I did it, so what,
then it's really hard to, I'm sure you guys know, to try to
hold they feet to the fire. Every now and then it happens
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but I think that -- I'm sure you guys know about the case
out of Texas where the prosecutor and that judge, they end
going on trial and was found guilty for what he did in the
case where they wrongfully convicted a person but that's
the only case that I know about that.
MS. MOYES: I think one downside to the Alford
Plea is that kind of ties your hands a little bit about what
you can do. Then the other thing in Ndume's case is so
much time passed by the time he got out, that the individual
prosecutors that were involved in the misconduct in his
case weren't practicing anymore. So there was no room left
for sort of professional consequence for them. But I do
think it's interesting what people are brainstorming about
doing in this area because I do think that we so need to hold
prosecutors more accountable than they are being held.
And I know recently I read about some effort to create like
a national data base where, you know, any time something
like this happens, we all can report it and then, you know,
you realize somebody's individual history and that maybe
over time it would be a way to hold people more
accountable. But I think that's a real flaw, you know, in our
current system and there have to be some reforms and
improvements to create more accountability than currently
exists.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I want to first say thank
you to both for telling your story. It's amazing. And it also
takes a lot of courage. And so I want to thank you both for
being here today. And I couldn't help but think when I was
listening to you, I have so many people, clients and
prisoners that I know, that are serving long sentences or
serving death sentences. I wonder, are you working with
any prisoners right now because I think that they could be
really inspired and sustained by your story and your
thoughts about how you made it through some many
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decades.
MR. OLATUSHANI: Yeah, actually I do. One of
the reasons I became a certified paralegal once I got off
death row was I wanted to be able to go back on death row
and work and see those guys over there and let them know
that as long as you alive, everything and anything is
possible. You just got to keep getting up. And so, but yes,
part of the work that I do is I work with, you know, guys
coming home from prison. A fine example, I mean just out
of the system where I was sitting down to lunch with a guy
who had spent thirty-eight years in prison, you know, just
got out and I guess now he had been home almost a month,
walked out of there after thirty-eight years almost eighty
years old, seventy dollars in his pocket, and people telling
him in order for him to get some type of benefits that he
need to at least show that he didn't work for ninety days
before he can get any type of Social Security benefits. So
part of the work that I do, yes, working with, you know,
guys coming home, but yeah, we also too work with guys
inside as well too. In fact, I'm working with a group of
people where we fixing to start this organization where we
working with guys in prison, but also too just trying to
prepare for something for them when they come home.
MS. MOYES: And I know Ndume too has, just
because of so many contacts that I have professionally, my
colleagues are sometimes aware of his storyand have asked,
“Would Ndume be willing to go talk to a client of mine,
he's really struggling about whether to take this plea that
involves a lot of time?” So he's always been willing to do
that, but I know if you had any ideas about, you know,
ways to make that broader, , I know that's something he's
interested in.
MR. OLATUSHANI: Anyway I can, yeah. I told
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guys before I left prison that -- like I said, I was one of
them people that I was always an advocate because one
thing that I knew while I was – even while I was sitting on
death row that I knew that I was fortunate than a lot of
people that was around me, even some people even outside,
I mean because surely you guys know, you got people
outside of here outside of prison that's in probably worse
prisons then people that's physically confined. I'm just
talking about from a mental standpoint. So I always knew
that I fortunate even sitting there, you know, and I was one
of them people that I was always advocating not only for
myself but for other people as well too. So, and I told the
guys before I left that once I get out of here, I will be out
here doing the work, that I ain't going to be talking about
what people ain't doing, I'm going to be doing it myself..
PROFESSOR RADICE: I think we have time for
one more.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Again, I would like to
thank you for being here. As somebody who has to deal
with the system every day and sometimes in the middle of
the night has thought about blowing the place up, you told
us about how your mother visited you and told you to get
up and get going, and I understand that and I understand
that video of you being happy to come out and I understand
how that can last for a while. I want to know how it is that
you manage everyday now not to want to blow the damn
thing up having been treated the way you've been treated?
MR. OLATUSHANI: Yeah, that's a good point.
You know, the thing that -- the thing that, you know, kind
of worked for me in terms of just getting back on track was
that being able to let go of that anger and let go of the anger
that I had for the people that did what they did to me. I
think that a lot of people when you, you know, talk about
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forgiveness and that type of stuff that, you know, people
think that's -- I mean it's really for us. I mean just like
standing up here, I mean as long as I stand up here and hold
onto this here, I can't never get up there to that door and
walk out of here. See what I'm saying? And that's what I
chose to do is just kind of let go of that doorknob so to say
and just begin to try to walk through the doors that was,
you know, that was taking me forward rather than holding
me back or having me looking back so, you know. I think
that -- I mean anger is a human emotion first off. I'm still -I'm mad about some stuff. I'm mad about some stuff. But I
just try to -- one of the things that I learned sitting, you
know, sitting in the small space was that, I mean we should
be mad about stuff because that's what -- that's when we get
motivated to do something and I just learned to just try to
channel my anger into positive stuff. And so, you know,
part of that mean, you know, kind of letting go of, you
know, whatever feelings or emotions that I had toward the
people or, you know, how it just kind of played out so, but
I'm mad as hell about the system. I'm trying to work with
you guys to change it.
PROFESSOR RADICE: Thank you so much, Ann
Marie and Ndume. What an incredible way to start off this
conversation. I know Penny said I did a ton of work but I
can't tell you how many times when things went wrong, the
person I called, and he's actually on my speed dial on my
phone right now, my cell phone, is Mark Stephens and so I
would like to invite him up here to introduce our next
speaker.
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ESSENTIALS TO JUSTICE: A RIGHT TO COUNSEL SYMPOSIUM
WHAT DOES A CLIENT HAVE THE RIGHT TO
DEMAND?*
By: Jonathan Rapping
Introduction: Mark Stephens
MR. STEPHENS: I must not have read the program. I
didn't know I was going to introduce Rap the Genius we
call him now. Rap recently won the MacArthur Genius
Award and so we're having a whole lot of fun every time he
does anything wrong or even questionable, we can throw
that at him about he's such a frigging genius, you think he
would be able to figure out this or that.
Several years ago, Jerry Black sent me a law review
article and suggested that I read it written by John Rapping
and it had something to do with building a foundation on
shaky ground or something, you know, I was just kind of
going through the motions. It was about how you structure
indigent defense within an institutional defender
organization and what Rap was basically saying in the
article, and I know I'm going to get a bunch of crap for this
because I'm sure I'm not summarizing it correctly, but what
he was saying is you got to start from the ground up and
you have to get the right people with the right commitment
to the work to come in and transform a culture of an office
that maybe isn't where it should be. You can't do that from
the top down. You have to do it from the bottom up. And
Rap was engaged in an organization called Gideon's
Promise. At the time, it was called the Southern Public
Defender Training Center, SPDTC, but so many people
choked on that name that they eventually had enough -- I
mean he is a genius, he had enough sense to change the
*

Edited for readability.
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name of the organization so the acronym at least is a lot
easier to remember. And so I e-mailed him and I told him I
don't know who you are but you get it, you get my world,
institutional defense at being public defenders and how to
structure public defense and so from that grew a friendship.
I consider Rap a friend of mine and his organization has
really transformed the Knox County Public Defender’s
Community Law Office. A third of my staff now have all
gone through Gideon's Promise. I don't hire anybody that
doesn't go through Gideon's Promise, and it is making an
incredible difference in my office.
It's making an
incredible difference in the work that we do in our
community. It has empowered and it fires up the older
lawyers that are in my office, and I'm very, very thankful
for Jerry Black for introducing me to Rap and then my
relationship that I've had with him over the last seven years,
so with that, let me introduce you to Rap. I also hope that
you can come by the reception tonight. We're going to have
a reception at the Sunsphere. We're going to tell you more
about Gideon's Promise and Rap and his wife Illy, who
really does all the work, and we would hope that you could
come and learn a little bit more about the organization so
with that, John Rapping.
MR. RAPPING: So if I was a genius, why would I
be hanging out with Mark Stephens? That's what everyone
is asking. I have to say thank you for your presentation,
both of you. When Ndume said we couldn't put people on
death row and execute people unless we saw them as
something less than human, you know, I couldn't agree
more. I think that's absolutely true. I think that extends
beyond death row. I believe we couldn't lock people up for
twenty years for drug offenses unless we saw them as less
than human, and I believe we couldn't lock up people
presumed innocent on bonds they couldn't make as they
lose their homes and jobs unless we saw them as less than
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human. I believe we couldn't shackle juveniles unless we
saw those children as something less than human. So I
couldn't agree with you more. I think that all of these
problems we're talking about are symptoms and the
problem we've got to tackle is injecting humanity back into
a system that's lost sight of that.
I'm reminded of that every day because I really am
married to a genius. Ilham Askia is the executive director
of Gideon's Promise. She's not a lawyer. I'm reminded of
that by just working with someone every day who lifted
herself from a different perspective.
So Illy grew up in a household where every man in
her family has been through the criminal justice system.
Her father got locked up when she was five years old. She
grew up and raised her baby brother. Every uncle and
cousin she knew was locked up. Her baby brother ended
up in prison, got out, back in prison. And Illy talks about
how she became a teacher because she wanted to interrupt
this cradle to prison pipeline at sort of the early part of the
process and she talks about how she met these lawyers who
represented the men in her lives and they didn't see the
humanity in them. They didn't learn who they were as
people. They didn't tell their stories and she had no faith in
public defenders.
And then she started meeting some public defenders
who were courageous and who care and who work against
incredible odds. And when we started Gideon's Promise
eight years ago, I asked her to take the year off teaching
and help build this organization and she didn't -- she hasn't
gone back because I think she believes that she can do
more good at this stage, the last stop before the cradle to
prison pipeline is finalized. But again, I think she reminds
me, and I appreciate, Ndume, you saying this again, that
this is about injecting humanity into the system. It's
shocking to me that we could have gotten to a place where
we have a system that sees people as so subhuman.
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It's shocking to me when I think about how last year
we celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon vs.
Wainwright, which I really see as a milestone, not a
criminal justice milestone, I see it as a human rights
milestone and a civil rights milestone. I think Gideon was
decided, it was, I don't think, I know it was decided in
1963. It was decided the same year as the march on
Washington, the same year as so many civil rights
milestones and that's not coincidental. It was decided at a
time when we as a nation were struggling with our rhetoric
not matching our actions, when we realized we weren't
affording people, humans, basic civil rights in all walks of
life and certainly the criminal justice system was one of
those areas. And so Gideon said something really simple.
It said that when a person is in the criminal justice system,
a complex system, complex procedures, complex rules,
they cannot receive justice if they don't have a lawyer. The
lawyer is literally the vehicle necessary to ensure that
justice is done. And if we believe in equal justice, which is
what Gideon was about, then it goes without saying poor
people have to have the kinds of lawyers that those of us
with means would pay for, right? It's really, I think, quite
simple.
And I think about this all the time, but as I sort of
thought about this coming over here, I was reminded of
some of the young lawyers I started working with when I
first moved to Georgia. I just saw Steve Bright walk in the
room and I remember I got a call from Steve Bright when I
was a lawyer in Washington, D.C. back in 2004, and he
asked how I would feel about moving from Washington,
D.C. to work with the public defender system in Georgia
and I was like, you got to be kidding. Then I talked to Illy,
and she was like, you got to be kidding me. We asked our
six-month-old daughter. She was like (unintelligible), you
got to be kidding me. But Steve's persuasive so we moved
down there and we started trying to do what Mark was
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talking about, build a community from the ground up of
sort of lawyers who were inspired and help them sort of
keep that inspiration.
And one of them after two years, she left. She
wrote a letter to the Atlanta Journal Constitution and she
talked about how she couldn't do the work any more
because she was sort of losing her soul. When she talked
about on the last thirteen months, she had closed nine
hundred cases. She calculated for the readers of the paper
that if she worked every single day taking no vacation and
working fifty hours a week for a year, she could give each
client three hours and so she quit because she felt she just
couldn't be the lawyer that Gideon demanded that she
believed she needed to be. And she left and that was sad.
That was sad to me. And over the years, I've seen a lot of
lawyers leave for that reason, but I think what was sadder
to me was she left behind a group of lawyers, many of
whom believed they were doing right by their clients, that
what they were doing was okay, that in fact, there are three
hour cases, and let me just be very clear when I say this
because I really don't want to be misunderstood. I do not
mean to be critical of those lawyers. They stepped into an
arena that most law students will graduate and never
consider stepping into. They have decided to do really
important work but they walked into a system that has
shaped them. It has shaped them and they have become
lawyers they never meant to be when they started, but
sometimes these systems make our public defenders
become lawyers who have to process human beings and so
to me, that was the sadder part of the story, was not that
Marie left, but that we have a system that allows so many
who have been left behind feel okay about the three hour
case,. And so I've talked to Mark Stephens about that quite
a bit, about this idea of the “three hour case,” and I think
there are a lot of public defenders who I respect who would
say to me oh, that case, you could do that case in three
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hours. And I actually think that's not true. I think there's no
such thing as a “three hour case.”
When Mark asked if I would speak about what
clients deserve, I want to talk a little bit about why I say
there is no such thing as a three hour case. I can't imagine a
case and I ask any of you to imagine the most minor charge
you could be charged with, and you walk into a lawyer's
office to hire them and they say it's your lucky day. I'm
looking at my calendar, I've got three hours this year that I
can give you. How many of you would hire that lawyer?
My guess is none of you for any case. And so what do
people accused of crimes deserve? I think, you know, we
can look to the floor, we can look to things like the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and that informs the answer a little
bit.
Here in Tennessee, like all over the country, you
have Rule 1.1, right, [referring to a slide] that's supposed to
be an incompetent lawyer with a clown mask. But
competence, quite literally, right, the Rules of Professional
Responsibility demand that lawyers have legal knowledge,
skill, that they are thorough, that they are prepared and that
comments made clear that in every case you must [engage]
in factual and legal analysis so that means before you ever
advise a client to plead guilty, you have to engage in factual
analysis. You have to do an investigation. You have to
identify legal issues and hit the law library or the computer
and do some legal analysis. That takes time. So that's step
one. I don't know how many of you how who have ever
sort been in courtrooms, have seen lawyers, and again, I
don't mean to be critical, I'm just curious, seen lawyers who
have advised clients to take pleas the day they meet them?
It happens all over this country. I would suggest to you
that, by definition, is a violation of Rule 1.1.
Rule 1.3, diligence. A lawyer has to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client. Steve Handlin is going to talk tomorrow about
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workloads and what's in your comments, and comments in
similar codes all over the country say is that a lawyer's
workload must be controlled. We can't be diligent if our
caseloads and workloads, and there's a difference, are too
high. Again, Steve will talk about that quite a bit. But
diligence, communication.
You know, the greatest
complaint that I think in most places, I haven't looked into
it in Tennessee, but I bet it's true here, the greatest
complaint to bar counsel when it comes to lawyers not
living up to their obligation to clients, is a lack of
communication, right? I've met again a lot of lawyers who
I have respect for, who will say to me I know what I need
to do in the client's case and I've got limited time and so I
would rather focus on that than going to meet with the
client. It is really missing something fundamental, right,
and that is it's not your case. It's your client's case. And
how can they direct you if you haven't communicated? That
communication means keeping clients informed, having
them, you know, replying to requests that they make for
information and explaining things so they can make
informed decisions.
This reminds me, I was doing a training in
Kentucky, a leadership training in Kentucky. This was a
few years ago. And I was leading a small group of
managers from Kentucky and we were talking, everyone
brought a management challenge and we were talking
about a management challenge. And one of the lawyers
said, one of my challenges is I've got this lawyer, he's a
really good lawyer, but he hates his clients. Whoa, time out,
right? That's like an oxymoron. How is that possible?
How can you be a really good lawyer and hate your clients?
I think what he meant was this lawyer is really good at
cross-examination, they're a great orator, but they're not a
great lawyer because a relationship with the client is, by
definition, part of being a great lawyer, but we're in a world
where we start to be -- it's signaled to us that being a good
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lawyer is about skills as opposed to representing people.
It's part of the dehumanizing that we see.
Conflict of interest, Rule 1.7, makes clear that you
are prohibited as a lawyer from taking on a case if that
representation may materially limit, may be materially
limited by your responsibilities to existing clients. And
quite simply, what that means is if I take on a case right
now, am I going to be able to give it all the time it deserves
looking at my caseload, and so I think what Rule 1.7 says if
you can't honestly say you are able to give every client
what they are entitled to do under the Constitution and the
Rules of Professional Responsibility, you are by definition
ineffective. Now I think as public defenders in this country,
listening to that, you think whoa, I'm ineffective. Yes.
You are, by definition, as a public defender in America,
you are ineffective, but rather than trying to cover that up,
rather than trying to suggest we are effective, that we can
do a three hour case, what I think we need to be doing is
owning the fact that we are ineffective and it's not our
problem; it's a system. We're in a system that won't let our
clients have the lawyers they need and we should own that
and we should move to improve it, but we shouldn't run
from it or we're becoming part of a community that is
justifying the process.
While not binding, the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice also tell you some other -- give you some other
insight into what clients deserve, right, duty to render
effective quality representation. Again, about the client, lots
in there about communication and interviewing and client
relationships, investigation and preparation, preparing for
trial. And this doesn't mean preparing for trial in those
cases that will go to trial. It means preparing in every case,
because how can you advise a client as to whether the right
course of action is foregoing a trial and taking a plea or
going to trial if you haven't prepared and you don't have a
sense of what the likely outcome is at trial and what the
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likely consequences are. Sentencing advocacy, I think was
illustrated in Ndume's case, right, often overlooked. And
advising clients with respect to appeal. So all of these, all
through the case, there are these obligations that I would
suggest mean that there is no such thing as a three hour
case. Are we there yet? I guess you know my answer to
that. No. We're not there yet.
And I think about when I first moved to Georgia
and we did a training. We did a training for all of the new
public defenders. There were chief public defenders.
There were brand new public defenders. And it was in the
first training January of 2005, and we this training on
motions practice, basic motions practice. And it was just, I
thought pretty straightforward stuff. It talked about filing
Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment
Motions, the kinds of motions I had filed in every single
case for ten years as a public defender, the kinds of stuff
that every law student learns in basic criminal procedure.
And we finished the session and one of the new chief
public defenders, one of the leaders who's tasked with
ushering in this new system in Georgia, came up and he
said, “I love that, that's great, but, you know, we can't do
that where I practice.” And I said, “what do you mean you
can't do that?” He said, “we can't do that.” And I said,
“oh, no, you can do it, I assure you. That's the Federal
Constitution. It applies in Georgia. You can do it.” And
he said, “no, we can't do that, because when we file
motions, our Judges get mad.” It was my first introduction
to a world where systemic pressures drive defenders to be
Judge-centered.”
I began thinking about that. And I sort of share,
you can't hear me talk without seeing this slide, so people
like Paul DeWolfe, who has probably heard me talk ten
times in the last two weeks because Gideon's Promise is in
this great partnersipp with the State of Maryland, and so
he's seen this slide more times than he would like to
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acknowledge. But I love this slide. It's my favorite
painting. It really is not about public defense. But it's all
about public defense. It's these robotic legs walking past
this homeless veteran curled up in a fetal position and the
label just says indifference, the caption is indifference, and
it's a simple message, right? We are all bombarded
everyday by so much misery and poverty that our defense
mechanism is so frequently to just kind of become
desensitized. It happens to all of us. It happens to those of
us who know better. We have a beautiful ten year old
daughter and a six year old son, and my daughter is this ten
year old homeless advocate. She wakes up in the morning
and she goes into her piggy bank and gets change and puts
it in a baggy so when we drive on her way to school down
the off ramp, she can give it to the homeless man.
And not long ago, I was walking down the street
and there was a homeless man who asked me for a dollar
and I said, “I'm sorry,” and I kept walking and I felt this tug
on my sleeve and I looked down, it's my daughter. And I
said, “yes?” and she said, “daddy.” And I said, “yes,
baby.” She says “doesn't that man need a dollar more than
you?” And I thought of course, right, it happens to all of
us. It's not like she just, you know, she just learned that
lesson in school. She gets that from her parents. But we
forget the lessons we teach our own children when we go
into systems and we go into the world every day that beats
that out of us. And it happens to lawyers all the time. Well
intentioned lawyers who are overwhelmed, who are forced
to look for shortcuts. And it's one thing to look for
shortcuts with your eyes open knowing that's what you
need to do and being thoughtful about it while you try to
change the system. It's another thing to accept those
shortcuts as what our clients deserve. And so, that's what I
think about when I think about culture.
Steve Bright is going to talk tomorrow and I'm sure
he will talk about what's happening in Georgia, but there's
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an opening for a new chief public defender in Georgia and
the state posted a job announcement and the job
announcement listed job requirements. One of the job
requirements was you're expected to run an office that
handles seventeen hundred cases a year with three lawyers.
That's five hundred and sixty-six cases each. The job
requirement wasn't, you have to have the passion, the
creativity, the thoughtfulness, the advocacy skills to change
this. The job requirement was you have to be able to do
this, as though this is okay.
I was watching a video of a budget hearing here in
Tennessee and there was one of the leaders here in
Tennessee was speaking for some of the public defenders
[and] was asked a simple question. Do you have enough
resources? And he described his situation. He said, “you
know, I've got five lawyers in a five county district and we
have five courthouses and I've got one investigator for
those five lawyers and last year we closed four thousand
cases, that's eight hundred cases per lawyer, and he said
we're blessed, we have enough resources.” And again, I
want to be really clear. I don't mean to suggest, if you
asked me ten years ago, I might have been really critical of
that human being. I'm not anymore. I now believe that is a
person who probably came into this work thinking it wasn't
okay to process eight hundred cases. But has become part
of a system that taught that's what justice for poor people
is. And, so, I really try to be less about pointing fingers and
placing blame and thinking how can we as a community
start to change that justice narrative that is accepted
something so far short of what we know clients deserve
until we get into a system that beats that out of us.
In D.C. recently, well, not recently, it's been a
couple years now, there was a story about a young public
defender, and DC is a public defender office, if you don't
know about that office, it is sort of a model public defender
office. Not because the public defenders there are any
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better than any of the public defenders I work with all over
the country, but because those public defenders have
manageable case loads, they have resources, they have an
eight week training program they go through before they
even handle a case. They are given, and I don't point to
them and say they should have less, they are given what
every client deserves and they have worked on changing
the culture and educating Judges and educating prosecutors
about what you better expect when it comes to advocacy
for poor people.
And a couple of years ago, a young public defender
in DC was before a Judge and it was a probation violation
hearing and her client lost his job and lost his home, and
was homeless, and one of his conditions of release was that
he maintain a residence and report his address to his
probation officer. Well, he didn't have an address. And so
the Judge said, “let me ask you one question, counsel, has
your client reported his address to probation?” She said,
“well, no, but he doesn't.” Stop counsel. That's all I need to
hear. I'm revoking probation.” She said, “Judge, you have
to understand. “Counsel, I don't want to hear another word
from you. “Judge, but he's homeless.” That's enough. One
more word and you will be help in contempt.” “But, Your
Honor.” Contempt. She was taken away and put in lockup.
Well, some of her colleges in the courtroom ran
back to the office and described it to the office and phone
calls started being made and motions started to be filed and
the next day all of the lawyers in the D.C. public defender
system showed up for work in the courthouse with black
clothing and a red armband. They were essentially saying,
we as a community aren't tolerating this and as an
organization, they stood up to a system and reminded the
system that this was a human being and he deserved an
advocate. And what was the end result there? A Judge
apologized.
Now, I'm not suggesting that will happen all over
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the country and that all of a sudden public defenders should
show up in red armbands. I'm not suggesting that at all.
But what I am saying is this was forty years of changing a
culture, forty years of reminding a system of what poor
people deserve and the question I think isn't how do we
change things tomorrow. It's how do we start reeducating
today and it's a long game.
So I'm going to end with a final story, and it's a
story about another young lawyer I know, a young lawyer
named Janelle. Again, I met her when I was working in
Georgia. Janelle in this remarkable lawyer. She came from
Brooklyn, New York, an all African American community,
and she went to Spelman College for undergrad Howard
Law School, both HBCUs, historically black colleges and
universities. Came to Georgia to become a public
defender, because in her words she wanted to represent
people who looked like her. And she joined this program
we started which was kind of like a Peace Corps for public
defenders where we invited public defenders to come to
Georgia and we placed them in places where the need was
the greatest and they didn't choose where they went. They
agreed for three years to go work somewhere. And she got
placed in Bartow County, Georgia. And it's about forty-five
minutes outside of Atlanta, but it may as well be a whole
other world. And Janelle, she was the only African
American female lawyer in the county at the time and she
would walk into court and she would describe how weeks
into her job she would walk into court with her suit and her
briefcase and the Judge would say, “where's your lawyer?”
And she started appearing, she started handling
juvenile cases. And she was in juvenile court and she had
a sentencing hearing or a disposition hearing and she was
going to argue that the Judge could not detain this client
because she found a less restrictive alternative in the
community, and by statute, the Judge has to go with the
least restrictive alternative. And she started talking to some
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senior lawyers in the community about that and the senior
lawyers said to her, “I wouldn't argue that.” The Judge is
going to laugh you out of the courtroom. This is what the
Judge does in every case. And undeterred, she started
calling some of her colleagues from the Honors Program,
which is what we called it at the time, the precursor to
Gideon's Promise. And people started talking to her and
saying, “of course, you got to make that argument.” ,And
she said, “of course, I do.” And so she sat down and
prepared a sentencing argument, and the next day she stood
up and she made that argument, [she] describes how she
heard snickers in the back, in the background, some of
these more seasoned lawyers who thought it was humorous
that she was doing this. And she made her argument. And
the Judge ended up agreeing with her.
And to this day, some of those snickerers now make
that same argument. Right. It's a story of how when we
individually can maintain sight of what our clients deserve,
and we can become part of a community that understands
that and starts to do that and spread that from county across
the state across the region across the nation. It's a long
game, but we can start to raise expectations so that maybe
fifty-one years from now that promise of Gideon will be a
reality.
The last thing I'm going to say is this: I really do, I
would be remiss if I didn't give a nod to so many of the
public defenders I know in the audience and many of you
who I don't know, but I do think what you all are doing in
Knoxville, Mark, and all of public defenders here in
Knoxville, it's not an easy place to practice and I know that
you all have case loads that are higher than they need to be
and sometimes you walk into courtrooms where you're
expected to do less than your clients deserve, but what I've
seen in working here and partnering with Mark and with
the Knox County Public Defenders Office over the last
probably six years now is really just a spirit that is
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contagious. Lawyers who don't quit. And I think while
poor people in Knox County, surely not everyone is getting
everything they deserve in every case, they have an
amazing group of advocates. So I just want to end by just
giving a nod to the public defenders, and can I ask you to
stand because I want to give you a hand, public defenders,
all the public defenders, come on public defenders. All
right. Thank you. I hope to see some of you at the
reception. It's been great.
PROFESSOR RADICE: Thank you so much. So,
we have the reception at the Sunsphere. I think it is going
to be just exciting and beautiful, and we will be showing
the movie around six-thirty, Mark? Six-thirty. So come
just for some drinks and some food or stay the whole time
for the movie and then everybody, we'll see you eightfifteen for breakfast tomorrow morning. Looking forward
to it.
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ESSENTIALS TO JUSTICE: A RIGHT TO COUNSEL SYMPOSIUM
WYC & LYN ORR DISTINGUISHED LECTURE*
IS MEDIOCRITY THE BEST WE CAN DO?
By: Stephen Bright
Introduction: Penny White
PROFESSOR WHITE: It is most fitting that the
Wyc and Lyn Orr lecture this year is part of the “Essential
to Justice: A Right To Counsel Symposium,” and it is
equally more fitting that the Orr lecturer is Stephen Bright.
If I had Ndume's talent and I were to draw a graphic for this
introduction, it would consist of three concentric circles, all
with the same center and the same common bond. The first
circle would represent Wyc Orr, the second, Stephen
Bright, and the third, the symposium, and at the core of all
three would be the commitment to make good at last on
Gideon's promise.
Over the past decade when the law school counted
its supporters, at the top of the list has been Wyc and Lyn
Orr. Wyc graduated from the College of Law in 1970 and
his wife, Lyn, graduated as an undergraduate from UT as
well. Their daughter, Kris, who is with us today, does not
have a UT degree, but she is an attorney and she practices
in the firm that she and her father started in North Georgia.
We welcome you, Kris, and we welcome your friend,
Angela, as well. Thank you for being here.
The Orr Brown Law Firm, and Wyc and Kris, have
a mission of helping others. And because of an uplifting
experience that Wyc had when he was a student at the
College of Law when the law school hosted Jim Neal as a
guest speaker, Wyc and Lyn endowed this lecture series in
*

Edited for readability.
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order to provide similar opportunities to members of the
law school community. The College of Law is grateful to
Wyc, to Lyn, to Kris for enabling us to share great speakers
like today with our students.
It is really most important that this lecture is held
this year in conjunction with the Right to Counsel
Symposium because fulfilling the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel was at the center of Wyc Orr's professional life
circle. The hallmark of Wyc's practice was a commitment
to the disadvantaged, a willingness to fight for equality, and
a passion for justice. Wyc served on the Georgia Public
Defenders Conference, on the Public Defenders Standards
Council, and he was an outspoken advocate for adequate
funding for public defenders in Georgia. Days before his
recent death, Wyc received the Lifetime Achievement
Award from Steve's shop, the Southern Center for Human
Rights. And so you begin to see the symmetry of this event.
In previous years before Wyc's death I would sometimes
have the opportunity to talk with the dean, and with Wyc,
and with Lyn about who would be a fitting person to
deliver the Orr lecture. Wyc often said that hearing Jim
Neal changed his life, and so we strive to meet a difficult
challenge, to find a speaker who inspired, who was
courageous, and who changed lives. Some years, we met
Wyc's challenge, bringing as the first Orr lecturer Jim Neal,
his personal hero, and then, in later years, Bobby Lee Cook,
his friend.
For many, many reasons, I wish that Wyc were here
today because he would enthusiastically acknowledge that
this year's Orr lecturer is a perfect choice, an extraordinary
individual who inspires, who is courageous, and who
changes lives.
Stephen Bright is the president and senior counsel of
the Southern Center for Human Rights. He is the Harvey
Karp visiting lecturer in law at Yale Law School, he is a
visiting professor intermittently at Georgia, Chicago,
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Emory, Northeastern, Harvard, and he is now the advocate
in residence at the University of Tennessee College of Law.
Periodically, he is referred to in Georgia as the agitator of
the year, and I think he is definitely going to earn that title
this year. Don't you, Steve? But Stephen Bright is not a
man of titles; he is a man of deeds. Steve's awards and
accolades could cover the walls of this room. There is a
documentary film that honors his work, books that have
been written about him and the lawyers he works with at
the Southern Center. He has received the ABA Thurgood
Marshall Award, the ACLU Roger Baldwin Medal of
Liberty, the John Minor Wisdom Public Service Award, the
NACDL Lifetime Achievement Award, and the NLADA
Kutak-Dodds Prize.
But Stephen Bright is not a man of accolades; he is
a man of deeds. He's written books and dozens of Law
Review articles and the titles sometimes make us uneasy,
for example, "The Death Sentence Not For The Worst
Crime But For The Worst Lawyer," "Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and
the Next Election in Capital Cases." And he can turn a
phrase. He tells us in our criminal justice system it is
poverty, not justice, that dictates outcome, and he says
America has an inquisitorial system posing as an
adversarial system with all the power concentrated in the
prosecution.
He's argued twice in the Supreme Court, numerous
times in Federal Court, testified in Congress, and made a
presentation before the United Nations. But despite his
literary gifts and despite his talent for oratory, Steve Bright
is not a man of words; he is a man of deeds. When Amy
Bach was researching her book Ordinary Justice and she
and Steve huddled with in a courtroom listening to a judge
who could not be heard, it was Steve who stood up and
politely asked the judge, speak up, these people have taken
off from work, they need to hear what you're saying, you
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are determining their future. And just recently when the
Georgia Public Defenders Standards Council engaged in a
sham application process to keep qualified lawyers from
knowing about and applying for the job of Cordele Circuit
Defender, Steve Bright not only sued the Council, he
applied for the job. So, by his actions, Steve exemplifies
what we all know but are sometimes too intimidated to say,
that justice cannot flourish when the defense a person gets
depends on the size of the person's bank account. He has,
by his actions, inspired generations to follow the thankless
call of indigent defense.
He has, by his actions,
demonstrated every day the power of respect and the
importance of honoring human dignity. He exposes cracks
in the system and he provides the mortar to plug them.
And that is why it is most fitting that today, in honor of
Wyc and Lyn Orr, the Orr lecturer is Stephen Bright. Join
me in welcoming him.
MR. STEPHEN BRIGHT: Thank you, Professor
White. When they named me the agitator of the year, I
wasn't quite sure how to take that. Dr. Joseph Lowery, our
great civil rights leader, the head of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, called me and told me that he was
once called a “racial agitator.” Not long afterward, he said
he went to visit one of the women in his church who took
him to the very back of her house to the room where the
washing machine was. She told him that it doesn't matter
how hot the water, it doesn't matter how strong the soap,
she didn’t get anything done there without an agitator. So
agitators are necessary not only in washing clothes but in
stirring up issues, including some things that are
unpleasant, if society is going to get anywhere.
It is great to be teaching once again at this law
school. Dwight Aarons and I taught a class a few years
ago, and now Penny White and I are teaching a course on
the right to counsel. I am honored to be working with one
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of the great teachers here, one of the great lawyers that this
law school and that the State of Tennessee has ever
produced, Penny White. And I have met such outstanding
students here. Sarah McKee, who was in the class with
Dwight Aarons just a few years ago, went on to be a
Prettyman Fellow at Georgetown in Washington, following
in Penny White's footsteps, and is now back a public
defender in Nashville. I know many of the people that are
in the class this year are going to follow a similar path.
I am also also tremendously honored to give a
lecture named for Wycliffe and Lyn Orr and that is
attended by Kris Orr Brown, his daughter and law partner.
Last spring, in the last few weeks of his life, my
organization, the Southern Center for Human Rights,
recognized Wyc. We thanked him for all that he had done
and particularly for his willingness to speak out. Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. pointed out the value of a person
who speaks out and says what needs to be said no matter
how uncomfortable it may make the listener. Wyc was one
of those people. He spoke out about the shameful quality
of legal representation for poor people accused of crimes in
Georgia.
It was no secret. Right there in Gainesville where
Wyc practiced law, there was a lawyer who specialized in
title searches and real estate closures. He was conscripted
to do a certain number of criminal cases every year. Every
lawyer in town was required to represent a poor person
accused of a crime when his or her turn came. There was
no compensation. The real estate lawyer finally hired a
lawyer and filed a lawsuit seeking to prevent the judges
from assigning him criminal cases. He pointed out that his
practice was limited to real estate closings and title
searches, that he did not have the personality to be a trial
lawyer, and yet he was being assigned to represent young
men facing tremendous amounts of prison time but he was
not competent to do it.
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On the third day of a trial in Gainesville, it was
discovered that the person sitting at the counsel table beside
the defense lawyer was not the person whose case was
being tried. The wrong person had been brought over from
jail and the lawyer didn’t even realize it was not his client.
The lawyer said the man kept saying it's not me, it's not me,
but he thought he meant that he was not guilty. But it was
not the right person who was on trial.
Wyc did everything he could do to expose this kind
of representation and see that people accused of crimes
were competently represented. He was a driving force on
the Georgia Bar’s indigent defense committee. Getting the
Georgia Bar to do anything about indigent defense is about
like trying to move Stone Mountain down to Macon. But
he did it. He was head of the Georgia Indigent Defense
Council, which allocated what little funds the Georgia
legislature would appropriate for indigent defense in the
1990s to counties to improve representation. The county
officials would agree to do certain things in exchange for
the funding, but many of them just took the money and
never did what the Council required of them. But Wyc
persisted. Eventually, three consecutive chief justices of
Georgia made the right to counsel a priority. One of them
appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission and appointed Wcy
to it. The Commission recommended creation of a public
defender system.
The legislature followed the
recommendation and created the system which finally
started providing representation on January 1, 2005, over
40 years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright holding that states must provide counsel to
people accused of crimes who could not afford to retain a
lawyer.
When he honored, congratulated and thanked him
for all that he had done on the evening that we recognized
him, he said simply, “I've always felt that if there is going
to be a fight, it should be a fair fight, particularly if
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someone’s life or liberty is at stake. And that is what I am
here to talk about – a fair fight for people whose liberty and
whose lives are at stake. When people accused of crimes do
not receive competent representation and, as a result, it is
not a fair fight, the courts lose their legitimacy and their
credibility. People do not have faith in their verdicts and
their sentences. They do not respect the criminal courts
because they are not entitled to respect.
I would like to discuss three things. The first thing
is the importance of the right to counsel just from the
standpoint of the clients.
I offer these comments
particularly to the law students who are here. Because the
answer to the failure to provide counsel is not going to
come from the courts, it is certainly not going to come from
judges, it is not going to come from bar associations,
although it should, and it is not going to come from
legislatures. It is going to come from people who graduate
from law school dedicated to making the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel a reality and willing to go to places where
they are needed to serve people facing a loss of life or
liberty. That is who is making the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel a reality in this country today – public defenders
and dedicated private lawyers. A law school graduate can
make a tremendous difference as a public defender.
Secondly, we must recognize the complete failure to
enforce the right to counsel over the last 50 years by all our
institutions from the Supreme Court of the United States on
down. It is more than a crisis; it is a colossal failure to
made good on the most basic constitutional right that is
essential for fair trials and reliable verdicts. No right is
celebrated so much in the abstract and so little in reality as
the right to counsel. And every day, from the highest court
in the land to the municipal courts that serve as cash cows
for their communities, the right to counsel is violated day in
and day out.
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And, finally, a little more must be said about what
can be done to make the right to counsel a reality in these
courts. As I said, the judiciary and those responsible for
the criminal courts are not going to do it. Many of those
courts are courts of profit that bring in thousands of dollars
in fines, fees, forfeitures, surcharges and other assessments
for their communities. They are worried about moving
cases as fast as possible. But these courts of profit are not
courts of justice. They are unwilling to spend money to see
that those charged are competently represented and fairly
treated. Beyond that, the legal profession is largely
concerned the incomes of lawyers, even if it means that the
legal system fails completely as a dispute-resolving
mechanism for the rest of society.
There are times when the bar and legislatures
respond to crisis, but there is not the sustained commitment
to the right to counsel that is needed for a fair and just
system.
When Harold Clarke was Chief Justice of
Georgia, he described the representation of the poor in one
of his annual addresses to the legislature as follows: “We
set our sights on the embarrassing target of mediocrity. I
guess that means about halfway. And that raises a question.
Are we willing to put up with halfway justice? To my way
of thinking, one-half justice must mean one-half injustice,
and one-half injustice is no justice at all.” Chief Justice
Clarke, a real gentleman who tried to see the best in
everything, was being charitable. Because Georgia had
never set its sights on the target of mediocrity; it had never
aimed that high. It had tried to do a little as it could get
away with. Gideon came down in 1963, a decade after
Brown v. Board of Education, when Georgia and other
southern states were in massive resistance to the Court’s
decision requiring integration of the schools. They paid no
attention to a decision that said states had to provide
lawyers for poor people accused of crimes. Georgia just
left representation of the poor up to its 159 counties, which
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were not inclined to pay for representation of the accused.
But finally it became so embarrassing and the chief justices
kept pointing it out, so the Georgia legislature brought
representation up to a level that still wasn’t mediocrity, but
a little better than what it had been. But then, everyone
went home – the Georgia Bar, the new Chief Justice, and
others were off to other things even though there was so
much more to do with regard to the right to counsel.
You heard yesterday from Ndume Olatushani, who
spent time on death row for a crime he did not commit.
That is about as good a reason as you will ever hear about
why the right to counsel is so important. The best possible
guarantee against the conviction of the innocent is a
competent, capable, well-resourced lawyer defending the
accused. And that is true in cases not quite as dramatic as
Olatushani’s.
I received a letter not too long ago from a young
woman whose apartment had burned – she lost everything
except the clothes she was wearing. She lost photographs,
her diploma, everything. She worked hard at two jobs, got
a place to stay and continued to attend her community
college part-time. But six months later she was charged
with arson. She was assigned a public defender who
recommended to her – as she wrote in all caps – “A
PERSON NEVER CHARGED WITH ANY CRIME OF
ANY SORT IN MY LIFE, TO TAKE 15 YEARS.” She
said, "I declined."
She went on to write,
“My lawyer missed
his court dates. I've been to
court so many times that I
finally lost both of my jobs.
Because I have this arson
charge pending over me, I
can't get a job. I have no
place to go. I'm a certified
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nurses' aid, but I can't find
employment because of this
arson charge. I don't know
how to fix this. I've asked to
be placed in jail because I
fear I may take my own life,
or I may die from the
conditions of being homeless.
But my request to be taken to
the jail was denied as well.
“The last offer was 10
years and restitution of half a
million dollars. I told my
attorney, I said I don't care if
I spend the next 20 years in
prison, I'm not going to plead
guilty to something I didn't
do. I will never accept the
blame for something I didn't
do. A guilty plea even with
no jail time will ruin my life
more than this case has
already. It means I will never
be able to use my nursing
degree, and I will never be
taken seriously.”
She already appreciated the collateral consequences
of a conviction. She continued:
“I've lost my job. I've
lost my dogs. I sleep in my
car. I'm now going to lose
my car because I can't make
the next payment. I'm tired,
I'm beaten, and I don't
understand how to fight this.
My only question is what to
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do now when I have no way
to care for myself? I just
don't want to die without
someone knowing what these
people have done to me and
how I have cried out for the
last three years. I'm only 23,
Mr. Bright, and I have fought
to stay afloat for the last three
years. I just want to know
what's left for me to do.”
Her whole life was in the balance, as much as if she
were facing the death penalty. She could either be
convicted of arson and never again be a useful and
productive citizen, or she could get the case behind her
because she was not guilty of arson and move on and be a
nurse, get her degree from college, and go on with her life.
We took her case. I know that innocent people get
convicted in arson cases. Todd Willingham was executed
in Texas after being wrongly convicted in an arson case.
We found a lawyer who had represented insurance
companies in arson cases for 30 years, knew about the
forensic testing that is done in arson cases and all the
leading experts. He provided his services pro bono.
Within a short time he had taken the prosecution’s case
completely apart. We met with the assistant district
attorney and the lawyer played a video on his laptop
showing how quickly the fire could spread and that it
started above the ceiling because of faulty wiring, not
where they thought it did. He demonstrated that there was
no case against the woman. The prosecutors dismissed the
case.
And she went on with her life. She was a
remarkable young woman. I remember one day when we
were in court, and I looked over at Shanna, our client, and
she was reading and underlining in her textbook while she
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was waiting for her case to be called. Since the case was
dismissed, she has worked sometimes 60 hours a week –
always 40, but sometimes 60 – taking care of mentally-ill
people who need nursing care. She is back in school
getting her degree.
Her public defenders could have helped her enter a
guilty plea if she had accepted the plea offer. They were
perfectly capable of that. They did it all the time. But they
could not try an arson case. They did not have a lawyer
who knew the arson science, what experts to call, and how
to investigate an arson case. The public defenders lacked
the time and resources to learn how to defend an arson case
– or even to reach out to someone like the insurance lawyer
who could have helped them. Other innocent people
accused of arson will not receive a capable defense.
Robert Halsey, executed by Georgia in December,
2014, was represented at trial by a lawyer who was about to
be indicted, and ultimately convicted and disbarred for
stealing client funds. He was so concerned about his
situation that he was drinking a quart of vodka every day
during the trial. He did not put on evidence of Holsey’s
intellectual limitations or any evidence that, as a child, he
was, as Judge Rosemary Barkett put in her dissent, subject
to abuse so severe, so frequent, so notorious, that his
neighbors called his childhood home “the torture chamber.”
The state trial judge who held a hearing on the
representation thought it was obvious that Holsey had been
denied the effective assistance of counsel and was entitled
to a new trial. He granted a new trial, but the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the despite the vodka,
the pending indictment, and the failure to present critical
evidence, it would not have made a difference.
The Court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Strickland v. Washington, which allows judges
to sweep ineffective lawyering under the rug by saying
there is a substantial probability that the lawyer’s deficient
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performance did not make a difference. When courts make
this finding – that it probably didn’t make a difference –
their legal holding is that there was no ineffective
assistance of counsel, despite the scandalous quality of
representation. The media reported that the courts found
that Holsey’s lawyer was not ineffective and that’s
technically correct under Strickland but completely
dishonest with regard to the representation that Robert
Holsey received. It is a significant way in which the courts
hide the truth about how poorly people are represented.
Thurgood Marshall, the one justice who had
actually been in trial courts and had tried death penalty
cases,231 was the sole dissenter. He pointed out that the
Court had adopted a malleable standard that it is in the eye
of the beholder – some judges will say it made a difference
and some will say it did not. But judges are unable to
determine whether bad representation at a capital trial made
a difference. They didn’t see the witnesses. They weren't
on the jury. Yet they make a guess that it didn’t make a
difference, shrug their shoulders, and send the defendant to
the executioner.
Eric Wyatt was arrested in March in Ben Hill
County, Georgia. He kept trying to get the public
defenders there to talk to him. One of the important roles
that attorneys play is in interviewing and counseling
clients. Wyatt spent four months in jail and didn't talk to
anybody. Finally, he is hauled to court in a jumpsuit and
chains. That’s the way those accused are treated – like
slaves. There is a lot of discussion of re-entry programs.
But it is unrealistic to expect that people who are abused by
law enforcement, degraded and humiliated by the courts,
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See Gilbert King, Devil in the Grove, a Pulitzer Prize-winning
account of the defense of black youths accused of rape of a white
woman in Groveland, Florida in the late 1940s by Thurgood Marshall
and other lawyers from the NAACP.
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brutalized in prison are going to overcome all that in a few
months in a re-entry program.
When Wyatt gets to court, a public defender tells
him he can plead guilty and be sentenced to 20 years in
prison, 10 to serve. There has been no interview with the
public defender. No investigation of the charges. Wyatt
has been trying to tell them that he is not guilty, but he has
been unable to get a public defender to listen. He rejects
the plea offer and is returned to jail. Eight days later, he is
called from his cell to the front of the jail and told the
prosecution has dismissed the case and he is free to go. He
would not have been in jail four months if his public
defender had talked to him about his case, looked into it,
and explained to the prosecutors what they found out later –
that there was no case against him. Of course, he is just a
poor fellow and no one cares.
Jacqueline Winbrone had a similar experience in New
York. She was arrested and bail was set at $10,000. No
lawyer represented her at the bail hearing, and Winbrone,
who was the sole caretaker of her husband, could not reach
her court-appointed lawyer to seek a bail reduction in order
to care for her husband, who needed transportation to
dialysis treatment several times per week. Days later, her
husband died.232 Eventually, she contacted a prisoners’
rights organization that secured her release on her own
recognizance – her promise to return for court. Ultimately,
the charge against Winbrone – possession of a firearm
found in the family car – was dismissed.
We were recently contacted by a man who was
arrested for driving under the influence. He was thrown in
jail. He had no lawyer. He was taking care of his mother
who was in her 90s; he fed her, clothed her, cleaned her,
and everything else. Without his care, she died while he
232
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was locked up. These are the consequences that most
people never think about. There are no small cases. If you
are a lawyer, you can prevent these kind of things from
happening.
In Florida, lawyers missed the statute of limitations
in the cases of 34 people sentenced to death.233 That means
that 34 people condemned to die will never have their cases
reviewed by federal judges who have life tenure and some
protection in following the law that elected state court
judges do not have. There is no more basic responsibility
of a lawyer than filing within the statute of limitations in
any kind of case. If a person cannot file papers on time,
that person should not be practicing law. If state bar
associations care at all about protecting the public from
incompetent lawyers, they should be suspending and
disbarring those lawyers. But as long as the victims of such
gross malpractice are poor, the bar associations take no
interest, even in capital cases.
A lawyer in Houston, Jerome Godinich, missed the
statute of limitations in three federal habeas corpus cases in
2009. Both clients were executed. Yet, the Texas Bar took
no action, nor did the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
One would hope that at least the trial judges in Houston
would quit appointing him to represent poor people in
criminal cases or – at the very least – stop appointing him
to represent people in capital case. But the judges kept
appointing him so often that he has had 350 criminal cases
at one time. One of his clients, Juan Balderas, was
sentenced to death in Houston in March 2014. The only
way to explain this is, at best, that the judges do not care
what kind of representation poor people receive, or, at
worst, that judges are intentionally appointing incompetent
lawyers to make it easier for prosecutors to get convictions
and death sentences. The judges know how bad he is; they
233

Lugo v. Secretary, 750 F.3d 1198, 1216-18, 1222-26 (11th Cir.
2014) (Martin, J., concurring) (listing the 34 cases).

150

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 151
would not have him represent a member of their family in
traffic court, but they appoint him to represent people
facing the death penalty.
In many courts, people accused of crimes are
processed in assembly line fashion. When they get to
court, a lawyer who they have never seen before tells them
about the prosecution’s plea offer and tells them to take it
or they will get a much more severe sentence. After a
conversation of five to fifteen minutes, the defendant
pleads guilty, the judge accepts the plea and imposes
sentence. This meet ’em and plead ’em processing of
people is the utter corruption of the courts. The judge
knows, the prosecutor knows, the defense lawyer knows,
the lawyers sitting around the courtroom know – everyone
knows that there is no legal representation whatsoever of
the defendants. It is like a fast-food restaurant – putting on
a slice of lettuce and moving it on, putting on a tomato,
putting on a pickle, and moving it on down the line. This is
not representation.
How could this be? The primary reason is that the
government that is trying to convict people, trying to fine
people, trying to imprison people, trying to kill people, has
no incentive to provide a lawyer to those people who might
frustrate its purpose. And so most state legislatures, county
commissions, and city councils do as little as they possibly
can with regard to providing representation and the courts
let them get by with it. And prosecutors take full advantage
of the perfunctory representation of the poor. It was not
always that when. When Clarence Earl Gideon's case was
before the Supreme Court presenting the question of
whether a poor person accused of a crime had a right to a
lawyer, twenty-three state attorneys general led by Walter
Mondale, then the attorney general of Minnesota, filed an
amicus brief in support of Gideon and the right to counsel.
They said if there is going to be an adversary system, then
the accused must be represented by a lawyer just as the
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government is represented by a lawyers. Today, most
prosecutors oppose any efforts to improve representation
for the poor and, at least in my experience, they are usually
successful.
What do we do about this? I recently applied for
the job of public defender in a four-county judicial district
in Georgia. The public defender office has three lawyers
and a caseload of 1,700 – 566 cases for each attorney. It is
a rural area and a lot of time is spent in travel from one
county to the others, which gives the lawyers even less time
to work on their cases. And the lawyers are incompetent.
One wrote a letter to one of her clients who had told her he
wanted a preliminary hearing asking the client to write and
tell her why he needed a preliminary hearing.
I applied for this job because I am so discouraged
that so little is being done about a problem that is so great
and an issue that is so fundamental to how human beings
are treated in the courts. I have gone to a lot of meetings; I
have written some articles; I have testified before
Congressional and state legislative committees; our office
has published some reports on the problems; and we have
filed some class action lawsuits seeking to improve things.
But I feel like we are not accomplishing anything. We
must to go to the places where we are needed and make the
right to counsel a reality in those cases. Law students,
upon graduation, must go to the places where the need is,
where people are languishing in jail without lawyers, and
provide representation.
In response to my application, I was interviewed by
two senior lawyers who practiced in the district. They
asked me how, with two other lawyers, I was going to
handle all of the cases. I said we're not going to do it. It is
impossible. There are four counties and each one has an
adult court, a juvenile court, and a jail. Three lawyers
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cannot be in all those courts and all those jails and provide
people with real legal representation.
“Representation” is a term of art. It involves much
more than meeting and pleading people guilty. It involves
interviewing each client – some, particularly those with
intellectual limitations or mental illnesses – will require
several interviews. It involves counseling each client and
answering the questions they have, learning about their
backgrounds, developing a sentencing plan if the client is
convicted. It involves investigating – obtaining police
reports and other documents and interviewing witnesses. It
includes looking into whether there are any legal issues in
the case and raising them in motions and other pleadings
such as requests for jury instructions. It involves being as
familiar as possible of the prosecution's case, getting
discovery asking for any exculpatory evidence. I told them
that just relaying a plea offer from a prosecutor to a person,
that is not representation. And the Sixth Amendment
requires representation.
If we cannot provide
representation because of the number of clients we already
have, we must decline taking any more cases.
There is also the ethical responsibility to accept a
case only if the lawyer can represent the client competently.
Every lawyer is bound by this ethical requirement. A
lawyer who had 300 clients and is asked to take another
one is going to have a choice of neglecting some of the
existing clients to represent the new one, or giving short
shrift to the new one in order to continue providing
representation to the clients the lawyer already has. And
so, not being able to do one of those things, we would have
to stop taking cases that we could not handle competently.
They would need to find lawyers from somewhere else to
take the cases until we got the public defender office to
where it needed to be. Obviously, it needed a lot more
lawyers – at least twice as many as it now has – and it
needs investigators. It became clear that I am not going to

153

Fall 2014 | Volume 10 | Issue 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 154
get that job. Because the decision that is being made there
and the decision that is made all across this country is to
minimize costs, not meet the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment and the ethical responsibilities of lawyers.
The decision is to process people through the courts, give
them a few minutes with a lawyer and call it representation.
This corruption of the courts, this treatment of the
poor has some serious repercussions beyond the harm done
to the accused, their families and their communities. There
has been a great deal of concern about white law
enforcement officers killing unarmed black men in
Ferguson, Missouri, Staten Island, Cleveland, Milwaukee
and other places. There have been demonstrations and
even some riots, as there were in the 1960s in response to
police shootings of blacks. People of color know they are
being abused all the time by law enforcement. All over this
country a person of color is more likely than a white person
to be stopped by the police, more likely to be abused during
that stop – knee in the back, chokehold, gun pointed, made
to sit in squad car, handcuffed – more likely to be arrested
at the end of that stop, more likely to be charged with a
more serious crime and denied bail, and more likely to be
treated more harshly all the way through the court system.
The courts are the institutions least affected by the Civil
Rights Movement. The courts are not much different now
than they were in the 1940s and 1950s. The judges are
white. The prosecutors are white. The defense lawyers are
white. Even in communities where 35 percent of the
population is African-American, the jurors are all white
because the prosecutors are striking all the blacks from the
jury. The Supreme Court decision in Batson v. Kentucky,
which was supposed to prevent discrimination in striking
juries, may as well not exist. Many people of color know
this system is not legitimate. They know they will not be
treated fairly there. They are being marginalized and they
realize they are being marginalized by the very institutions
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that are supposed to uphold order and the rule of law. And
that mistreatment coupled with the lack of legitimacy and
credibility of the courts produces distrust, bitterness,
hopelessness, and desperation. People feel that they are
outside the system – denied its protections and subject to
abuses from it – and outside the larger community.
There are things we can and must do – large and
small.
We must keep bringing lawsuits to make
“representation” a reality. Mark Stephens, the community
public defender in Knox County, has filed two lawsuits.
The first one declared that his office could not represent all
the people who were entitled to representation and the
courts appointing the mayor of Knoxville, a Congressman,
and some other prominent lawyers and almost immediately
there was funding for public defense. More recently he
filed a lawsuit about caseloads. He may have lost the suit,
but when it was over his staff had grown substantially and
the number of cases had been reduced. Public defenders in
Missouri and Florida have brought suits to limit caseloads,
but, unfortunately, many public defender offices are not
independent and cannot bring such suits.
My experience in Georgia demonstrates that the
people in control of public defense in that judicial district
are not going to hire anyone who would challenge
caseloads. The same is true for the entire state. The
director of the public defender agency in Georgia serves at
the pleasure of the governor. His main concern is that no
one in the public defender agency do anything that might
aggravate the governor, not zealous representation of poor
people accused of crimes. If a public defender challenged
case loads in Georgia, he or she would be fired and the case
would be over.
Georgia had an independent system briefly, but it
was too much justice for Georgia. Wyc Orr was on the
board when the public defender agency was created in
2004. He and other members of the board cared about
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representation. They would go to the legislature and say
we cannot do the job with the funding provided. After
about five years, the legislature amended the statute and
gave the governor the power to appoint a majority of the
board. He put people on it that cared little about right to
counsel and more about limiting expense. So any lawsuit
to enforce the right to counsel in Georgia is going to be
brought by an organization like the Southern Center for
Human Rights because the public defenders are not able to
do it.
Gideon's Promise, the program directed by Jon
Rapping, is critical to making the right to counsel a reality.
One of the great challenges is to overcome the culture in
places where it has become acceptable to process people
through the system instead of representing them. Gideon’s
Promise is teaching law school graduates how to represent
the poor in criminal cases. It teaches more than trial
techniques. It teaches the attitude that one must have to be
an effective public defender. It is producing the people
who will refuse the 300th case or the 156th case when they
can no longer represent clients competently and ethically.
The question for real representation and for fairness
for the accused is an enormous issue, bigger than any one
of us. The struggle has gone on for generations and will
never end. But as Dr. King said, we stand on the shoulders
of others so that someday others will stand on our
shoulders. Those of you who are now students can make a
huge difference in the lives of people like Shanna
Shackelford, Eric Wyatt, and Jacqueline Winbrone. You
can get people released on bail so that they keep their jobs,
their homes, and their means of transportation. You can
keep them from becoming a street person. You can keep
them alive. Of course, you are not always going to be
successful, but that is one of the things that makes being a
public defender such a high calling, right up there with
kindergarten and elementary school teachers and people
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who run soup kitchens and other people who serve those
most in need.
A doctor who was reflecting on treating Ebola
victims, said that one of the most valuable lessons he had
learned as a doctor was what you could do for patients
when there was not anything medicine could do for
patients. The same can be said for what a lawyer does
when there is nothing the law can do for them. A lawyer
can still be there to be their confidant, their friend, their
supporter, the person who's there for them when no one
else is.
My friend William Neal Moore was sentenced to
death a long time ago, and when the judge sentenced him to
death, he said, "Mr. Moore, you will be taken to the
Georgia State Prison and so many volts of electricity will
be run through your body on September the 20th until
you're dead and may God have mercy on your soul.
Sheriff, take him away, take him away." His lawyer never
told him that there was an automatic appeal. He never told
him that he was not going to be executed on September
20th. So Billy thought he was going to be executed that
day. As the day is getting closer, he is writing his sister
and his mother in Columbus, Ohio. There is nobody with
him in Georgia. But when the day came, he was not taken
off to be executed. It is not hard to see the value of a
lawyer as a counselor, talking to him and letting him know
that they would be an appeal and explaining the whole
review process in the state and federal courts. About all the
reasons to hope – for a reversal in the courts or, as in
Billy’s case, commutation of the sentence by the Board of
Pardons and Paroles.
The law is a system of oppression that masks a lot
of cruelty. But being a lawyer can be a helping profession,
just like teaching school, like practicing medicine was at
one time. People who are committed to that old-fashioned
notion of practicing law – the client-oriented, the family-
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oriented lawyers with a good “bedside manner,” – who are
reaching out to people, and doing it every day, despite all
the setbacks, are in some small way taming some of the
savagery and the corruption of the system and making the
world a little more gentle, a little more humane, and a little
more decent for all God’s children.
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